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PREFACE 
This is the 28th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries. Animals are a source 
of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and possibly 
foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of wealth, 
provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means of 
transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.  
This paper presents a case study of how livestock policies are made and implemented 
in a national context, and how they can be improved to better serve the interests of 
the poor in Burkina Faso. The paper highlights three potential constraints - weak 
livestock producer organizations, poor animal health service provision, and 
commercial weaknesses — on the potential contribution of the livestock sector to 
improving poor people’s livelihoods and recommends strategic actions for overcoming 
each of them. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
Author 
Martha Gning, under the direction of David K. Leonard. Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The livestock sector has a key role to play in improving the livelihoods of Burkina 
Faso’s 5.5 million poor, but livestock’s potential contribution is limited by existing 
political and economic dynamics.  Implementing successful pro-poor livestock policies 
requires an understanding of these political and economic dynamics.  This paper 
provides an analysis of the current political forces that limit livestock’s potential 
contributions to fighting poverty and sheds light on political and economic forces that 
can assist in generating pro-poor livestock policies. 
Organizational Context 
The first section of this paper addresses the organizational landscape of Burkina Faso’s 
livestock sector.  It emphasizes the existing discrepancy in the organizational 
resources and cohesion of the various sub-sectors of the livestock sector. 
•  In rural areas, livestock associations are not uncommon, but these rural 
associations have had little influence on local, regional, and particularly, national 
policies.  Rural associations tend to focus their attention on NGO or donor activity.  
Many associations have been created to work with donor-sponsored projects and 
have fallen apart after the projects’ end.  Furthermore, rural associations tend to 
avoid any activity that could be perceived as “political”. 
•  At the national level, all-inclusive livestock producer associations have not proven 
politically or economically effective.  The existing Fédération des Éleveurs de 
Burkina Faso (FEB) faces strong criticism for its inability to address the needs of the 
livestock producers outside the cattle sub-sector.  It is difficult for any all-inclusive 
agency to generate a common policy platform from the disparate needs and 
priorities of livestock producers in Burkina Faso. 
As neither existing rural organizations nor all-inclusive national associations appear to 
possess the organizational cohesion and strength needed to influence policy makers 
and to provide real services to their members, this paper recommends that interested 
actors focus on two more viable types of livestock organizations. 
•  Exclusive, regionally-concentrated associations have become an important, lasting 
part of the livestock sector’s organizational landscape.  At the provincial level, 
herders unions (syndicats des éleveurs) have gathered significant followings and 
established themselves as important actors in provincial politics. 
•  In urban and peri-urban areas, producers associations have also emerged in recent 
years but tend to incorporate only relatively well-off producers.  These small, 
exclusive organizations have achieved significant levels of cohesion and 
accumulated resources, and as a result, have had some influence in policy-making 
circles. 
While these organizations can provide important allies in the fight against poverty, 
they also present unique challenges.  Herders unions tend to be ethnically based, 
which can provide an important source of cohesion but can also be a source of 
criticism.  Furthermore, they tend to replicate existing inequalities within the Fulani 
culture.  Membership in peri-urban producers associations has been limited to specific 
sub-sets of the livestock producer population. Consequently, while they can help to 
produce policy change in the livestock sector, these associations will not necessarily 
use their influence to promote pro-poor policies.  This paper acknowledges the 
important contributions to be made by these two types of organizations and sees them 
as the most viable partners in any pro-poor efforts but also cautions that there are 
potential inequalities inherent in these organizations and their relationship to 
livestock producers. Executive Summary 
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State Interventions, Animal Health and Livestock Market Conditions 
The second section of this paper addresses current livestock market conditions and 
considers the state of animal health in Burkina Faso as it relates to the potential 
development of pro-poor livestock policies. 
•  This paper contends that one of the best ways to help poor producers is to target 
the traditional, family-based poultry sector.  Traditional, family-raised poultry, 
which accounts for approximately 70 percent of all poultry production in Burkina 
Faso, provides an important means for poor families to improve their livelihoods.  
Demand for traditionally raised poultry is very high in Burkina Faso and has not 
been displaced by demand for semi-industrial poultry or frozen imports, but 
producers are not able to meet this demand, in large part because of disease-
related animal losses.  This paper therefore proposes interventions to facilitate 
poor producers’ access to vaccines as a key step to improving poor producers’ 
livelihoods.  
•  This paper emphasizes that the small ruminant and cattle sectors offer an 
important means for improving producer livelihoods, but that they cannot develop 
until the transaction costs involved in exporting cattle and small ruminants to the 
West African sub-region are reduced.  Furthermore, these sectors require capital 
infusion and expanded access to credit.  Therefore this paper encourages 
interested actors to explore innovative means of providing credit to those butchers 
and exporters at the higher levels of the cattle and small ruminant sector. 
•  Finally, this section advocates an informed re-examination of the role of the state 
in providing animal health care.  It argues that the state has withdrawn from many 
of the basic animal health services it ought to provide, including the prevention of 
epizooties, but has not withdrawn from those areas where the private sector could 
feasibly take over animal health care provision.  This paper therefore recommends 
t h a t  s o m e  h u m a n  r e s o u r c e s  b e  r e d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d  p r e v e n t i o n  o f  e p i z o o t i c s .   I t  
recommends that other financial and human resources be used to produce a new 
system of paraprofessional veterinary service provision under the supervision of 
contracted private veterinarians. 
Power in Burkinabè Politics  
Finally, the third section of this paper addresses the larger political dynamics in which 
livestock policy decisions are made.  It emphasizes that the points at which political 
pressure may be applied in Burkinabè politics are highly limited—the president, the 
governing party, and influential individuals with close contacts to the president or his 
entourage.  While Burkina Faso is moving toward democracy and decentralizing 
political power, this paper argues that the normal channels of democratic politics are 
not yet the most effective means of enacting policy change in Burkina Faso.  Instead, 
it points to four potential way of influencing livestock policy. 
•  Because Burkina Faso’s government has adopted the formal practice of democratic 
elections, there is an emerging opportunity to build coalitions among politicians 
seeking popular support and livestock producers.  Particularly in areas with a high 
concentration of livestock producers, politicians may find it in their interest to 
champion pro-poor livestock policies in parliament and with the government. 
•  Furthermore, the government of Burkina Faso has begun a decentralization 
program which may yield significant changes in local politics.  This provides an 
opportunity for rural reform but also poses a significant challenge as many 
livestock producers have been marginalized from local politics.  It is important, at 
this point in time, to provide livestock producers with the training and knowledge 
needed to make the most of decentralization. Executive Summary 
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•  The Ministry of Livestock is a politically marginal ministry.  Unfortunately this has 
meant little funding or support for the ministry; however, it has also given the 
ministry important leeway in dealing with the livestock sector.  Its political 
marginality has insulated the ministry somewhat from the political maneuverings 
that undermine so many other ministries in Burkina Faso.  This political insulation 
and room for experimentation makes the ministry a valuable partner in pursing pro-
poor policies, as does the general pro-poor outlook of many civil servants in the 
ministry. 
•  Finally, this section emphasizes the dismal financial resources of the Burkinabè 
state and the Ministry of Livestock, and their dependence on foreign assistance to 
fund policy implementation.  While this situation of dependence has negative 
consequences so numerous as to warrant a separate study, this paper also points 
out that from dependence grows a willingness to adopt pro-poor policies when 
these policies are funded.  Related, but far more positive, this paper highlights the 
fiscal importance of livestock revenue to the state and argues that producers could 
gain political weight if they were able to demonstrate to politicians precisely how 




Burkina Faso consistently ranks among the poorest countries of the world.  Although 
many Burkinabè may not self-identify as “poor”, they live in a precarious economic 
position.
1  The threat of poverty is ubiquitous; a drought, a poor harvest, an illness in 
the family, or a closed border with a neighbouring state can easily push families into 
serious poverty.  How can international and local Burkinabè actors help eliminate or 
reduce the threat of poverty?  The answers for Burkina Faso are not easy, or as this 
paper demonstrates, necessarily politically popular.  Those searching for a simple 
guide to eliminating poverty in Burkina Faso through the development of the livestock 
sector will not find it here.  Instead, this paper seeks to provide a realistic analysis of 
the current political forces that limit livestock’s potential contributions to fighting 
poverty.  It also sheds light on political and economic forces that can assist in 
generating pro-poor
2 livestock policies.  
Because livestock has always fulfilled fundamental economic and social roles in 
Burkina Faso, it can—indeed must—be a central force in improving the livelihoods of 
Burkina’s 5.5 million poor people.  The government of Burkina Faso estimates that 85 
percent of all households depend on livestock for some part of their income (MRA 
2000, 9).  For this population, livestock constitutes a form of savings and insurance.  
Many young farmers rely upon livestock ownership and care to learn financial 
responsibility, gain independence, and accumulate resources (Kondombo et al. 2003).  
For women in rural and urban areas, livestock provides a source of revenue to help 
meet household needs. Furthermore, though sometimes overlooked in national 
politics, livestock accounts for between 19 and 25 percent of Burkina Faso’s exports, 
making it the country’s second largest source of foreign currency after cotton. 
Livestock further constitutes approximately 12 percent of Burkina’s gross domestic 
product (MRA 2000, 9). 
Livestock’s importance goes beyond the economic realm.  Animal husbandry as a 
profession is generally limited to Burkina’s agro-pastoral population.  But livestock is 
integral to social, religious, and economic activities in all Burkinabè societies.
3  As a 
result, livestock has a potential social and economic role to play in improving 
livelihoods and reducing poverty in Burkina Faso.  Unfortunately, its actual 
contribution has been limited. 
Through a close study of the political economy of the livestock sector, this paper 
seeks to identify the forces that limit the role of livestock in combating poverty.  It 
does not provide an easy formula for creating pro-poor policies but offers a realistic 
portrayal of the contested and sometimes unequal political arena in which these 
policies must be made.  By doing so, it is able to identify strategic points at which 
concerned organizations and actors can apply pressure or intervene to help create 
pro-poor livestock policies. It should be considered in conjunction with, and not 
exclusive of, poverty reduction studies based on more technical methods and those 
based on anthropological research.  The conclusions offered in this paper are based on 
extensive interviews with policy makers, researchers, and observers of the livestock 
                                                 
1 Hagberg (2001) found that Burkinabè associate poverty with the inability to move or migrate, personal crises or disabilities 
that hamper one’s ability to work, drought, and resistance on the part of wealthier neighbours or relatives to help keep one 
out of poverty.  
2 Pro-poor is a relative concept.  By American or European standards, the vast majority of Burkinabè are poor in economic 
terms.  However, within Burkina vast differences exist in poverty levels by region, village, or even household.  In this paper, 
an attempt is made to distinguish different degrees of poverty whenever possible.  “Poor” is meant to refer to those living in 
a precarious economic situation who could easily fall into poverty, as well as those whose personal or social situation forces 
them into long-term poverty (Iliffe 1987). In a general sense, “poor” as it is used in this paper is not meant to include 
relatively large-scale farmers, large landholders, traditional authorities with access to resources, government employees, or 
those possessing large herds of cattle or capital intensive fattening or dairy farms. 
3 Kondombo et al. (2003) highlight the social importance of livestock in their study of village chicken production. Introduction 
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sector.  These interviews were substantiated through a survey of government, non-
governmental organization, and academic documents conducted in late 2004.
4  
 
                                                 
4 For the purposes of respecting anonymity, interviewees have not been cited by name.    
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
Making pro-poor policies is extremely difficult in any sector.  Considering the nature 
of politics and power relations, it is surprising that pro-poor policies ever get made.  
After all, individuals living in the most precarious economic situations are rarely 
active in politics.  The poorest segments of the population are frequently unorganized 
and geographically dispersed, and they lack any real political or economic “stick” with 
which to influence government.  Instances when the poor really drive politics are as 
rare as they are short-lived.  Politics in Burkina Faso is no exception.  Even during 
Burkina Faso’s “people’s revolution”, those who took the reins of power and 
influenced policy did not come from the lowest rungs of Burkina’s economic and social 
system.
5 
Although at first glance there seems to be little reason for politicians to implement 
pro-poor policies, such policies do get made in Burkina Faso and elsewhere.  Cohesive, 
far-reaching organization on the part of poor populations is one of the few factors 
that can drive politicians to implement pro-poor policies.  This is particularly true 
when poor populations have an economic “stick” with which to intimidate or influence 
politicians.  Poor populations can constitute the backbone of an economic activity 
upon which the fiscal survival of the state depends.  In these instances, poor 
populations may use the state’s dependence on their labour or goods to influence 
policy.  They can make effective pro-active demands on the state because these 
demands are backed by a threat to withhold important resources from the state.
6  But 
demand-making usually requires a high level of formal organization, allowing 
populations to present a unified front.  Livestock producers in Burkina Faso have not 
achieved the cohesion and organization required to use their control over Burkina’s 
second largest source of foreign currency to make pro-active demands on the state. 
Since independence, the Burkinabè state has tried numerous times to organize 
livestock producers, but the results have been limited.  The associations that emerged 
under state guidance focused their efforts on purchasing inputs and functioned more 
as distributional arms of the parastatal system than as independent livestock producer 
associations.  Livestock producers have also organized of their own accord.  In rural 
areas, associations are not uncommon.  Yet, these rural associations have had little 
influence on local, regional, and particularly, national policies. 
At the national level, all-inclusive livestock producer associations have not proven 
politically or economically effective.  Meanwhile, exclusive, regionally-concentrated 
associations have become an important, lasting part of the livestock sector’s 
organizational landscape.  At the provincial level, herders unions (syndicats des 
éleveurs) have gathered significant followings and established themselves as 
important actors in provincial politics.  However, as addressed below, these unions 
have faced strong criticism for their ethnically-exclusive membership base.  In urban 
and peri-urban areas, producers associations have also emerged in recent years but 
tend to incorporate only relatively well-off producers.  These small, exclusive 
organizations have achieved significant levels of cohesion and accumulated resources, 
and as a result, have had some influence in policy-making circles.  But as addressed 
below, their membership has been limited to specific sub-sets of the livestock 
producer population.  Consequently, while they can help to produce policy change in 
the livestock sector, these associations will not necessarily use their influence to 
promote pro-poor policies. 
                                                 
5 For a discussion of the political make-up of the revolutionary government, see Loada (1994) and (1996). 
6 In Senegal, for example, the government changed its agricultural policies to more farmer-friendly policies when it saw 
export earnings plummet as a result of a groundnut farmer movement to sell groundnut crops in neighbouring Gambia and/or 
to abandon groundnut farming (Diop and Diouf 1992). Organizational Context 
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Rural Associations in Burkina Faso 
The relatively limited political influence of rural livestock producer associations is 
symptomatic of more general trends among rural organizations across Burkina Faso.  
Rural associations have been common in Burkina since the 1970s, but these rural 
associations have never had the political weight of urban associations in policy-making 
circles.  Although members of both urban and rural associations have been sceptical of 
the state, urban associations such as labour unions and student groups have translated 
this scepticism into attempts to limit or change state actions through protests, strikes 
and negotiations.  On the other hand, rural associations’ scepticism has led them to 
avoid the state.  According to Engberg-Pedersen, in order to avoid the dangers of 
“politics”, rural associations and their members try to limit contact with the state.  
Wariness of the state leads rural associations to focus their energies on activities that 
will keep them free from “politics”, but as a result they are less apt to engage the 
state than their urban counterparts (Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 35). 
The disengagement of rural associations from national politics has been aggravated by 
the failure of the Burkinabè state to incorporate Burkina’s rural population directly 
into national politics.  Burkina Faso inherited a highly bifurcated state from the 
French colonial government.  Under this system, rural Burkinabè were governed more 
as subjects of local authorities than citizens of the Burkinabè state.
7  For all practical 
purposes, rural Burkinabè were not part of the political world which achieved 
independence from the French in 1960.  Upon independence politicians and policy 
makers sought the support of rural voters through channels of traditional authority 
rather than direct contact with rural citizens.  Corruption and clientelism thrived 
under this political system.  Rather than establishing state power via a rational state 
bureaucracy, those in power distributed state goods and positions via unofficial 
channels to powerful rural leaders who in exchange promised the support of rural 
voters (Engberg-Pedersen 2003, ; Loada 1994). 
After coming to power in 1983, the Sankara government tried to incorporate the rural 
population into national politics by replacing traditional authorities with local 
revolutionary councils.  While this system sought to end the political marginalization 
of rural Burkinabè, it did so on the government’s terms causing the incorporation of 
rural Burkinabè to occur on very unequal terms.  Despite the revolutionary discourse 
to the contrary, Sankara’s revolutionary project relied upon a totalitarian vision which 
employed centralized, top-down state intervention to achieve its revolutionary goals.  
As a result, while “revolutionary in many ways, Sankara’s project actually reinforced… 
the marginalization of the rural population” (Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 23). 
In recent years, the Burkinabè government has pursued important political reforms 
designed to democratize the political system, but the rural population has not yet 
been fully incorporated into national politics via direct channels.  Despite a far-
reaching decentralization policy, most researchers believe that the central state 
continues to rely upon traditional authorities for rural support (Loada 1994, ; Loada 
1996, ; Tallet 1996).  Because intermediaries continue to dominate rural politics and 
the decentralization process has not yet been fully realized, rural Burkinabè remain 
largely marginal to national politics.  Today there are signs that this situation may be 
improving.  President Compaore’s apparent commitment to (limited) democratic 
reforms may indicate that politicians see the incorporation of rural voters into 
national politics as a necessary step toward legitimizing the political system (Otayek 
1996). 
According to many observers, the implementation of development projects in Burkina 
Faso further reinforces the very local and apparently apolitical focus of rural 
                                                 
7 See Mamdani (1995) for a discussion of the bifurcated state. Organizational Context 
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associations’ efforts and limits their lifespan.  Almost all observers and documentation 
consulted during this research project argue that rural associations are often created 
in response to the requirements or encouragement of development projects (Diawara 
1996, ; Engberg-Pedersen 2003, ; Hagberg 2004, 202).  This causes associations to see 
themselves as project associations.  They focus their efforts on achieving project goals 
or extracting resources from project sponsors.  Being closely tied to a given project 
does not encourage political activism or branching out to new issue areas because 
association members fear losing the association’s advantageous relationship to the 
project.  Furthermore, association members may be entirely focused on project goals 
and see the association only as a means for facilitating the project, not as a means for 
pursuing other goals.  Some observers worry that rural associations may serve as little 
more than advocates of a given project, weighing in on political issues only in defence 
of the project to which they are attached.  This study found very little evidence that 
development projects, as they are implemented today, ultimately increase rural 
organizational capacity.  Quite to the contrary, because the existence of rural 
associations is so closely tied to that of development projects, associations rarely 
outlive development projects or go on to pursue a wider advocacy or service agenda. 
A further reason for the limited political power of rural associations may stem from 
the nature of association leadership.  In a controversial argument substantiated by 
interviewees, Diawara (1996) contends that many of Burkina Faso’s new rural 
associations serve primarily as political jumping boards and sources of personal wealth 
and respect for association leaders in Burkina Faso.  As multiple observers noted of 
associations in the livestock sector, decision-making processes are rarely democratic.  
Some associations may not even be seen as legitimate representatives by their own 
members.  Yet this has not stopped association leaders from profiting personally and 
politically from their associational title.  According to Diawara, many leaders create 
and head rural associations in order to access potential resources.  Serving as the 
intermediary between rural populations and the state or project donors allows leaders 
to gain status, financial resources, and political access.  By Diawara’s account, the 
advancement of association members’ common interests does not figure prominently 
in the drive to create associations.  If Diawara’s image of leaders as courtiers de 
développement is correct, as many observers believe, this bodes ill for the political 
development of rural associations.  This type of leadership limits the possibilities for 
collaboration between associations as leaders compete to be the primary 
intermediary.  It also limits associations’ eventual capacity of to engage the state 
because they do not have the strong, committed membership base needed to 
negotiate with it. 
When placed in context, livestock producer associations’ lack of political weight and 
cohesion is not nearly as exceptional as many argue it to be.  While common, 
associational life in rural Burkina is frequently focused toward local apolitical issues 
and is often excessively tied to development projects.  Rural associations do not seem 
to pursue a pro-active, political role focused on defending common interests.  Instead, 
they attempt to avoid “politics”.  Rural associations engage the state infrequently and 
instead focus their attention on the donor-sponsored projects to which they are 
closely tied.  The state, in turn, does not strive to incorporate rural populations into 
the political sphere. 
The Challenges of Organizing the Livestock Sector 
Observers frequently lament that Burkina Faso does not have an effective, all-
inclusive livestock producers’ association to serve as an intermediary between 
producers and the state, noting that cotton producers have greatly influenced national 
policy thanks to a national federation.  This paper argues, however, that it is highly Organizational Context 
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unlikely, if not impossible for any all-inclusive association to thrive in Burkina Faso’s 
livestock sector. 
As noted earlier, highly organized poor populations can push forward pro-poor 
policies, particularly when they control an economic “stick” with which to pressure 
the government.  However, successful organization usually requires certain facilitating 
conditions.  Geographically concentrated producers organize more easily that those 
that are spread out over a large area.  When producers share a common identity, this 
increases their likelihood of successful organization because they have something to 
organize around.  Finally, when an organization appeals to a fixed group of potential 
members who share a set of common needs or priorities this makes long-term 
organization more feasible.  Unfortunately, for Burkina Faso’s livestock sector as a 
whole, these conditions are not present. 
The sheer diversity of the livestock sector limits wide-spread organization among its 
producers.  To argue that livestock producers share an economic activity is in fact 
misleading.  Livestock producers vary considerably in the type of animals they raise, 
the technology they employ, and the importance of livestock production to their 
economic and social needs.  The economic realities and needs of rural producers 
raising three to five chickens differ almost fundamentally from those of investors 
running fattening farms for cattle in peri-urban Burkina Faso.  Any national-level, all-
inclusive livestock association would face serious dilemmas the livestock producers 
outside the cattle sub-sector.  There is little reason to believe another all-inclusive 
association would fare better. 
The diversity of livestock sector producers makes it almost impossible to form a 
c o m m o n ,  s h a r e d  i d e n t i t y  a r o u n d  l i v e s t o c k .   A s  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  a l m o s t  8 5 %  o f  a l l  
Burkinabè households are involved somehow in livestock production.  For the majority 
of these households, raising livestock is not their primary economic activity, nor does 
livestock production determine their social position.  Ironically, while the 
commonness of livestock production makes it an interesting intervention point for 
poverty alleviation and makes it a potentially strong “stick” with which to influence 
state policy, this commonness also makes it virtually impossible to create a strong 
national-level organization that can represent the entire sector.  In most contexts, 
those who are only marginally involved in livestock production simply do not identify 
as livestock producers; as a result, they are unlikely to organize around this identity.  
Furthermore even if they were to participate in a national-level association, those 
producers for whom livestock production constitutes their entire livelihood or their 
primary source of identity would still dominate any national-level association.  For the 
latter, livestock production is so important to their livelihoods and identity that they 
will always have stronger incentives to participate. 
The third force working to limit the development of an all-inclusive national 
association is livestock producers’ geographic dispersion.  Because livestock 
production occurs across almost the entire Burkina territory, the transportation and 
communication costs associated with national-level organization are prohibitive.   
While livestock production is concentrated in certain areas, any organization based 
only in these areas would fail to incorporate many of Burkina’s small-scale livestock 
producers who are precisely those most susceptible to economic insecurities.   
Employees of state and internationally-funded interventions in the livestock sector 
have found it difficult to evenly implement livestock related policies across the entire 
Burkina territory.  It is difficult to imagine, in this context, that a resource-poor 
national association would be able to effectively travel to all areas where livestock 
production occurs. 
In the absence of any successful national-level organizational efforts, two types of 
livestock producer associations have come to dominate the livestock sector: peri-
urban professional associations and provincial-level herder unions (syndicats des 
éleveurs).  Both types of associations are based on relatively exclusive membership.  Organizational Context 
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(They rarely exclude members explicitly but appeal to a relatively limited number of 
potential members.)  For these associations, exclusive membership appears to favour 
associational development.  In the livestock sector, broad-based, inclusive 
membership may not facilitate collective action.  Instead appealing to a small set of 
members,  who share a common identity and common needs, allows existing 
associations to successfully organize producers.  Both types of associations address the 
particular production and economic needs of a sub-set of livestock producers.  They 
do not take on the entire range of issues affecting the sector, instead they try to 
change policies and address issues which are of pressing concern to their members.  
This has the distinct advantage of concentrating organizational efforts on achieving 
visible outcomes that may induce members to become more committed to the 
association.  Although the exclusive nature of these associations raises important 
doubts about their potential role in pushing pro-poor policies, any intervention 
seeking to empower livestock producers must take advantage of these pre-existing, 
relatively cohesive associations. 
Peri-Urban Professional Associations 
Peri-urban professional associations group producers involved primarily in semi-
intensive production of poultry, pigs, and/or dairy.  The three main associations today 
are the Maison de l’Aviculture (MDA—House of Aviculture), Maison des Éleveurs de 
Porc (MEP—House of Pork Producers), and most recently the Association de 
Promoteurs du Lait Local (APLL—Association for the Promoters of Local Milk).  All 
three associations are composed primarily of producers found in and around Burkina’s 
two main urban centres, Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, and all three fulfil both 
advocacy and service-provision roles.  
At present, both the MDA and the MEP receive financial assistance from the French-
funded  projet d’Appui au Renforcement Institutionnel des Organisations 
Professionnelles d’Eleveurs modernes (ARIOPE).  This project helps cover the 
organizational costs of professional associations in the modern livestock sector by 
providing assistance for training sessions, staff costs, etc.  In the case of the MDA, 
ARIOPE also convinced the Burkinabè administration to place a part-time technical 
assistant at the MDA to facilitate the association’s service delivery role.  Although the 
project continues to provide some assistance to the MDA, the MDA has achieved a 
remarkable level of financial self-sufficiency in recent years.  By offering veterinary 
and other supplies at a discounted rate to members (whose numbers are ever-
increasing), the MDA is able to sustain its own staff and operational costs.  The MEP 
has not yet reached a similar level of self-sufficiency, but the ARIOPE project director 
and MEP members believe the association is moving along the path toward self-
sufficiency and hope it will reach this point before the ARIOPE project ends in 2006. 
While the director of the MDA recognizes the important role ARIOPE has played in 
helping the association, he also believes that the association’s success is a reflection 
of the nature of semi-intensive poultry production.  When asked if the association 
could provide a model for other associations in the livestock sector, he argued that 
the specific conditions that allow for successful organization in the semi-intensive 
poultry sector exist in few other areas of the livestock sector.  The work of the MDA is 
facilitated by the fact that its members are relatively concentrated in one geographic 
region.  While time consuming, the MDA still travels to the peri-urban area and 
provides on-site services to most farms at least once a year.  Furthermore, members 
can come to the association’s headquarters to attend meetings and educational 
seminars and to purchase products and services.  More importantly, however, semi-
intensive poultry production is input intensive.  Semi-intensive poultry producers 
share a common need for reasonably priced inputs.  Consequently, they have a strong 
incentive to back an association which can facilitate the wholesale purchase of inputs.  
Furthermore, the costs of entry into this type of production are relatively high.  Those Organizational Context 
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who have chosen to pursue semi-intensive poultry production have made a 
considerable investment.  They try to minimize loses by investing in material inputs, 
veterinary inputs, and educational resources.  They therefore have a common interest 
in sustaining an association that can help minimize their losses. By focusing on these 
clear needs, the MDA has been able to provide tangible returns for semi-intensive 
producers.  The MEP is currently pursing a similar strategy; however, it remains to be 
seen whether pork producers in fact require the amount of inputs and services that 
poultry producers do.  At present, it is doubtful that the MEP will achieve the same 
level of financial performance as the MDA, as pork production is less input-intensive.  
If the service-provision side of the MEP is not used frequently or if the MEP is not able 
to provide services at an attractive price, it will be difficult for the MEP to become 
financially self-sufficient.  Similarly, the survival of the APLL will likely depend on its 
ability to meet diary producers’ common needs. 
The relative associational stability and cohesiveness of peri-urban professional 
associations has allowed them to play a role in livestock sector policy-making.   
Officials in the Ministry of Livestock recognize and work closely with these 
professional associations, as do state laboratories and research institutes.  Officials in 
the livestock ministry consistently list peri-urban professional associations as the most 
reliable interlocutors with which policy makers and state agents come into contact.  
Furthermore, although some members of these professional associations feel that 
state policy is made without their input, the Ministry of Livestock has generally been 
receptive to developing modern livestock production techniques.  Until recently, the 
minister personally promoted intensive, modern production as the future of Burkina 
Faso’s livestock sector.  Although not all members of the livestock ministry agreed, 
the policy preferences of the minister nonetheless set the general tone for ministry 
policy.  The current livestock minister has focused his attention on more traditional 
production modes but remains open to supporting modern production methods as well.  
Many observers argue that the Ministry of Livestock is more receptive to the needs and 
demands of semi-intensive producers than those of livestock producers involved in 
low-input, extensive production. 
Peri-urban associations’ location makes it easier to meet regularly with ministry 
representatives and attend conferences, meetings, etc. at which policies are 
discussed.  Similarly, peri-urban associations normally possess the language, 
computer, writing, and other professional skills needed to operate in the formal, 
bureaucratic sphere of state administration.  Finally, it is possible that peri-urban 
associations have found a more receptive audience to policy requests than their rural 
counterparts because it is easier for the state and donors to intervene in peri-urban 
production.  While costly, interventions are concentrated and produce visible results.  
Furthermore, the targets of these interventions are classic market actors.  To some 
extent, the cultural considerations which the state and donors appear to have such 
difficulty addressing in rural areas are not a great concern when dealing with peri-
urban, semi-intensive producers.   
Finally, peri-urban associations have also benefited from the personal and professional 
contacts of their members and leaders.  In some instances these contacts have 
allowed for associations to build partnerships with related associations in neighbouring 
countries and/or research institutes and international organizations working in the 
sector.  One of the most impressive examples of partnership-building is the successful 
bid by the MDA and other poultry producer associations in the West African region to 
convince the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) to revisit the tariff 
levels assigned to modern poultry inputs.  Using personal and professional contacts 
between association leaders, these associations were able to organize a regional 
campaign to petition the UEMOA to change tariff levels.  For example, considering the 
difficulty obtaining day-old chicks, the alliance pushed for reduced tariffs on the 
importation of day-old chicks.  However, recognizing the important potential to 
support domestic industry, they argued encouraged the UEMOA to raise tariff levels on Organizational Context 
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feed troughs and chicken coups.  Interviewees at the UEMOA noted that this type of 
regional organization is precisely the type of organization that can influence regional 
trade and tariff policies.  In particular, they noted that the poultry producers were 
able to commission convincing market and fiscal studies on the impact of UEMOA tariff 
rates and to provide concrete policy advice. 
In many instances, the personal and professional contacts of peri-urban producers 
have not served to strengthen peri-urban associations.  Instead, as several observers 
both within and outside the administration noted, these producers are able to either 
by-pass state regulations or are able to get personally-tailored policy and informal 
interventions from the administration.  Peri-urban producers frequently have very 
close ties to the administration.  Sometimes these “nouveaux acteurs” or “new 
stakeholders”, as they are often termed by social scientists working on Burkina Faso, 
are retired or even current civil servants.  Sometimes, they are business men or 
investors with close contacts to the state.  Without exception, they are more 
educated, literate, and well-off than their rural counterparts involved in extensive or 
low-input production.  Their professional contacts and resources help them receive a 
favourable audience with many state officials and potential business partners.
8   
The exclusive, relatively privileged membership base of peri-urban professional 
associations does not necessarily preclude them from helping to produce pro-poor 
policies.  Research has shown that pro-poor policies are sometimes implemented 
because the interests of well-off, better organized, or better connected individuals in 
a given sector correspond in some way to those of poor workers involved in the same 
sector.
9  In Burkina Faso, peri-urban associations and poor producers share several 
common interests; as a result, peri-urban associations’ advocacy efforts may generate 
some positive side effects for poor producers.  First, the production methods which 
the MEP promotes are not fundamentally opposed to those used by small-scale pork 
producers.  The veterinary needs, if not all the input needs, are actually quite similar 
across producers.  Furthermore, any policy designed to promote pork products could 
help increase demand for all pork products regardless of production method.  Second, 
the MDA is already working to combat the massive importation of frozen poultry 
products in Burkina Faso and neighbouring countries.  Many regional observers believe 
these imports have had disastrous consequences for domestic poultry (and increasingly 
meat) markets in much of West Africa (Gning 2004).  Any policies designed to limit the 
amount of poultry imported by Burkina Faso and its trade partners will likely have 
positive effects for all poultry and meat producers regardless of income level or 
production method.  Furthermore, there is little indication at present that the type of 
semi-intensive production promoted by the MEP, MDA, or even the APLL, will create 
any serious commercial competition for rural livestock products.  Their products 
appeal to different markets, and semi-intensive products are generally either more 
expensive or less attractive to most Burkinabè consumers than traditionally produced 
livestock products.  For example, while semi-intensive poultry is cheaper when 
measured by the kilogram, it is more expensive per unit than village chickens. 
Consumers buy per unit and simply cannot afford to pay more per unit even if they are 
getting more for their money.  Furthermore, even up-scale hotels and ex-patriot 
consumers frequently prefer traditionally produced poultry for its flavour.  At present, 
traditionally produced poultry represents in upwards of 70 percent of Burkina Faso’s 
                                                 
8 In their studies of new agricultural and livestock stakeholders, Friedberg (1997) and Ouédraogo (2003b) both found that, 
although diverse, new stakeholders had significant financial resources, professional and personal contacts, and alternate 
income sources that distinguished them from other agriculture and livestock producers.  For a surprising number of new 
stakeholders, the ultimate goal in owning and operating a farm was not necessarily financial gain.  Many stakeholders sought 
instead to increase their social standing and reputation or pursue a part-time hobby and were ambivalent to the economic 
performance of the farms.   
9 Swenson (Swenson), for example, has shown that business owners may at times favour coalitions with labour over coalitions 
with other business owners.  Organizational Context 
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total poultry production and satisfies approximately 24 percent of Ouagadougou’s 
total meat consumption (Ouédraogo 2003a, 6). 
•  Strategic Entry Point 1: Work with and provide assistance to pre-existing peri-
urban, semi-intensive producers’ associations on issues that affect all producers in 
the poultry, pork and dairy industries.  Tariffs and macro-economic policies are one 
level at which the interests of rural producers and peri-urban producers may 
coincide.  Furthermore, both groups can profit from basic veterinary health 
measures (not advanced veterinary health interventions required to raise exotic 
breeds), like vaccinations against Newcastle disease or efforts to stop the spread of 
African swine fever. 
Cautionary Point: Peri-urban, semi-intensive professional associations already have 
exceptional organizational advantages vis-à-vis their rural counterparts.  Although 
they can promote common goals and address common needs, they also have very 
specific concerns which are not related to those of extensive and low-input 
producers.  Any intervention that seeks to promote pro-poor policies with the 
cooperation of peri-urban associations must proceed cautiously and never lose sight 
of the potential anti-poor focus of associations designed to promote peri-urban, 
semi-intensive production.  This entry point is not a recommendation to provide 
general support to these associations.  They already have the contacts, professional 
skills and experience needed to seek out support.   Instead this entry point is 
meant to encourage anyone attempting a pro-poor intervention to consider the 
possibility that peri-urban professional associations can be valuable partners on 
certain policies.    
Herders Unions 
Cattle herders unions play an important role in organizing producers in the cattle sub-
sector at the provincial level in Burkina Faso.  These unions, which are primarily 
involved in advocacy and policy-reform efforts, have become an important factor in 
provincial level politics, particularly in debates around land tenure policy.  The ability 
of these herders unions to achieve a degree of cohesion, garner a committed 
membership, and present a united herder voice in provincial politics stems from three 
main factors.  First, these unions, by virtue of their provincial focus, have been able 
to limit the transportation and communication costs that often lead national 
associations to fail.  The geographical concentration also allows them to focus on the 
specific concerns of herders in their area.  Second, the herders that make up these 
unions are largely involved in the same type of production.  They raise cattle and 
some small ruminants, mainly through extensive methods.  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the herders in these unions are almost all of the same ethnicity, Fulani.  
They share a common identity beyond livestock rearing and are already, by virtue of 
ethnic and familial relations, part of a shared social system.  In fact many Fulani 
intellectuals are active in the unions despite the fact that they are not directly raising 
cattle.   
Interviewees inside the Ministry of Livestock and observers from outside agencies 
criticize the herders unions.  The provincial focus is argued to be too narrow.  The 
unions are critiqued for failing to include producers who raise livestock other than 
cattle or who employ other production methods.  (In fact, the name syndicat des 
éleveurs literally means a union of livestock producers, not a herders union.)  Finally, 
almost all observers strongly critique these unions for being predominately Fulani and 
for allowing Fulani intellectuals and politicians who are not directly involved in 
livestock production to become members.  However, it remains unclear whether they 
may in fact own cattle which are being cared for by family members or employees. 
Ethnicity is an undeniable fact in the organizational landscape of Burkina Faso’s 
livestock sector.  For agro-pastoralist cattle herders, livestock production is part and 
parcel of their ethnic identification.  It is not surprising therefore that agro-pastoral Organizational Context 
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producers have chosen to unite in associations which are predominately Fulani.  But 
because existing law does not allow the state to officially recognize ethnically-based 
associations, Fulani livestock producers have chosen to present their unions as 
professional livestock producers unions.  Fulani agro-pastoralists are not alone in this  
practice.  In fact, it is extremely common for ethnic groups in Burkina Faso to create 
associations which promote their ethnic groups’ rights and needs but to present these 
ethnic groups officially to the state as development associations or home-town 
associations.  Associations which are blatantly ethnic in nature are recognized by the 
Burkinabè state because in their official discourse they formally respect state laws 
limiting ethnically-based association (Hagberg 2004).  The oft-heard criticism of 
Burkina’s syndicats des éleveurs seems a bit misplaced if we consider the de facto 
ethnic nature of many voluntary associations across Burkina Faso.  Furthermore, in 
light of all the forces working against successful organizational efforts in the livestock 
sector, unions should perhaps be applauded for sustaining their collective efforts by 
drawing on one of the few social elements in the sector that is conducive to collective 
action.  But again if we consider the state’s official wariness of ethnic associations, 
these criticisms are not surprising, nor are they entirely unwarranted, as will be 
addressed below. 
Despite the criticisms levelled at herders unions, they have nonetheless managed to 
become important players in land tenure discussions at the local and provincial level.  
Undoubtedly this stems in part from the fact that unions have not excluded Fulani 
intellectuals and politicians from participating in the herders unions.  These urban, 
educated Fulani bring professional resources to the unions that allow them to engage 
in politics.  Unions provide important assistance to members, particularly in dealing 
with land disputes.  At one union office in Bobo-Dioulasso’s trade union building, 
“there is a permanent flow of people and information in the small office” (Hagberg 
2003, 129).  As noted earlier, rural associations frequently shy away from direct 
engagement with state representatives.  Herders unions, on the contrary, engage the 
state and attempt to use state law to further their cause.  For example, the unions 
represent members in court cases, they “carry out missions in villages that experience 
disputes”, and they organize public speeches and advocacy campaigns (Hagberg 2003, 
129).  By claiming that state law guarantees Fulani rights, herders unions seek formal, 
legal solutions to land disputes.  Hagberg argues that this rights-based engagement 
with the state has frustrated many government officials and supporters of agricultural 
farmers.  Many state officials would prefer that agro-pastoralists deal with disputes 
locally by “mobilizing [informal] relations to settle specific disputes” (Hagberg 2003, 
129).  If we consider the status of agro-pastoralist populations in rural land disputes, 
however, it is not surprising that herders unions would instead choose to resolve 
disputes through more formal state channels and call on state law. 
In most rural areas, the sedentary farmer population considers agro-pastoralists to be 
“strangers”.  Traditional rural authorities and local councils are generally drawn 
exclusively from sedentary farmers.  As Hagberg notes, local farmers consider Fulani 
agro-pastoralists as both “strangers” in the sense of coming from elsewhere and as 
“physically, economically, and culturally ‘different’ from farmers” (Hagberg 2000, 
165).  In this context, Fulani rarely have any right to land or resources.  They may be 
allowed to use land or to access water sources, but as strangers they do not have 
permanent rights to these resources.  Nor are they represented in the decision-making 
bodies that control resources at a local level.  When conflicts arise, they frequently 
feel that local councils or traditional authorities unnecessarily favour farmer interests.  
It is quite common for agro-pastoralists in conflict situations to turn to state officials 
or the court system to resolve the conflict, precisely because any rights the agro-
pastoralist population may possess are granted by state law.  Furthermore, 
representatives of central state agencies may in some contexts actually favour agro-
pastoralist populations, particularly in areas targeted for the development of livestock 
resources.  While some officials and observers may prefer that agro-pastoralists 
mobilize relations to solve disputes, agro-pastoralists may not in fact have the types Organizational Context 
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of powerful relations needed to solve disputes in a favourable way without recourse to 
the state. 
Fulani agro-pastoralists are actively engaging with the state via formal channels, but 
they are not well-positioned to profit from informal connections with the state 
administration.  While both Mossi immigrants and Fulani agro-pastoralists are 
“strangers” in many rural areas, Mossi immigrants appear to have easier access to land 
and suffer fewer run-ins with local residents.  Not only are Mossi immigrants 
numerically important, they also possess important contacts within the state 
administration.  Politicians and state administrators in Burkina Faso are predominately 
Mossi, thus making it easier for Mossi migrants to engage social networks to protect 
themselves in dispute situations.  As Hagberg notes, Mossi immigrants “are criticized 
[by local farmers], but feared for their “long arms” into the state administration” 
(Hagberg 2003, 136).  As noted earlier, many scholars believe that the political system 
and state administration in Burkina Faso operates to a great degree via informal 
channels not formal bureaucratic structures.  While it is admirable that Fulani herders 
engage formal state institutions to regulate conflicts with farmers, this formal 
engagement may not actually be the most effective means of affecting policy.  In 
recent years, the expansion of Mossi agricultural endeavours has resulted in numerous 
land disputes between Mossi migrants and Fulani herders.  In these situations, Mossi 
migrants may be better able, in the existing political system, to defend their interests 
than the formally organized but politically marginal Fulani populations. 
Agro-pastoral producers, however, have a potentially strong tool to use in negotiations 
with the state.  Fulani agro-pastoralists raise approximately 65 to 70 percent of the 
cattle in Burkina Faso and approximately 30 to 40 percent of all livestock in Burkina 
Faso (IEPC 2005, 7).  The exports of cattle and small ruminants, produced primarily by 
agro-pastoralists, provide between 19 and 25 percent of Burkina’s export earnings 
(MRA 2000, 18).  The Burkinabè state depends upon these and other export earnings 
for its fiscal stability.  Burkina Faso has suffered a structural trade deficit since the 
1970s.  Although lightened slightly in recent years by migrant remittances and foreign 
aid grants, the trade deficit remains a significant burden on the Burkinabè state and 
its domestic economy (Englebert 1996, 107).  Many observers of Burkinabè politics 
believe that state officials actively seek to expand export opportunities, or as several 
interviewees put it, “are searching for foreign currency”. 
To date, this quest for foreign currency does not appear to have made the state 
particularly focused on increasing livestock export earnings.  Nonetheless, a well-run 
advocacy campaign by livestock producers could raise awareness among the public and 
state officials about the critical contribution livestock exports play in combating the 
trade deficit.  Alternately a concerted protest action on the part of pastoral producers 
or a threat to stop exports for a period (a “strike” of sorts) could force the state to 
recognize the importance of agro-pastoral producers to its own fiscal situation.  While 
difficult to coordinate, strikes or protests can clearly demonstrate to politicians that 
agro-pastoral producers control an economic “stick” with which to drive forward 
negotiations.  Agro-pastoralists in Senegal, for example, employed the threat of a 
strike to force the state to revisit a land transfer policy that removed land from agro-
pastoralists’ control (Gning 2004). 
Though agro-pastoral producers control an economically important resource, herders 
unions have not yet managed to wield this control effectively in national level 
negotiations.  This appears to be the result, in large part, of organizational failings at 
the national level.  By most accounts, the Ministry of Livestock actually created the 
national-level Féderation des Éleveurs du Burkina Faso (FEB—Federation of Livestock 
Producers of Burkina Faso).  It did not grow out of pre-existing unions; rather it was 
created by Fulani leaders with ties to the livestock ministry who later, with the 
assistance of the ministry, attempted to build partnerships with existing unions.  This 
organizational approach has not been successful.  Most observers believe that the FEB 
floats above existing local and provincial level associations with no real ties to or Organizational Context 
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grounding in them.  Even members of the state administration who are actively 
involved in assisting the FEB recognize that it does not have wide-spread support, 
even among Fulani producers.  Few ministry officials are prepared to negotiate 
seriously with a “hollow” association like the FEB. 
To create a truly representative, active, and well-backed national federation, the 
organizational impetus would likely have to come from pre-existing unions.  In order 
to effectively employ their control over cattle and small ruminant exports to influence 
state policy, however, these unions would also have to incorporate Burkina’s large-
scale traders and butchers into the national level association.  While primarily Fulani, 
these traders and butchers have options beyond herders unions for influencing state 
policy.  At present, individual traders and butchers often possess “arms into the state 
administration” that agro-pastoral producers lack.  Like peri-urban producers, their 
personal contacts and professional work sometimes make it possible to either by-pass 
state regulations or get personally-tailored policy or informal interventions from the 
administration.  As a result, they have less immediate incentives to participate in a 
national-level association than producers themselves. 
This discussion of herders unions raises three possible entry points for empowering 
herders to promote policies that will help improve the livelihood of Burkina’s agro-
pastoral producers. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 2: Organizations seeking to help livestock producers organize 
must accept that herders unions are ethnically based and will remain so despite 
their need to present themselves as professional unions.  It may, however, be 
possible to take advantage of the cohesion of ethnically-based herders unions by 
using them to provide information, training, and legal assistance to agro-pastoral 
producers.  Particularly as decentralization proceeds, herders unions can help 
provide agro-pastoralists the information and political resources needed to make 
sure they do not lose out as decision-making roles are delegated to local 
authorities. 
Cautionary Point:  Herders unions are not exempt from the leadership and 
legitimacy issues other associations face.  Many observers critique these unions and 
similar Fulani associations for being unrepresentative even of Fulani producers.   
Unions are frequently lead by urban, educated Fulani whose connection with rural, 
poor producers may be tenuous.  Furthermore, these associations grow out of a 
pre-existing hierarchy in Fulani society.  Consequently, the most vulnerable 
producers, women and youths, are frequently excluded from leadership and 
decision-making positions, as are Fulani who cannot afford cattle of their own.   
Furthermore because women and youth are frequently more involved in the 
production of short-cycle ruminants and poultry, their particular production needs 
may not be addressed by the cattle-focused herders unions.  Finally, while unions’ 
active engagement with state law and state agencies is admirable from an outside 
perspective, it has generated great resentment among farmers, local state agents, 
and traditional authorities who argue conflicts should be regulated at the local-
level through negotiation. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 3:  By providing organization-building assistance to existing 
herders unions if and when they seek to build national-level coalitions, donors and 
other interested organizations can help create a stable national-level association 
through pre-existing associations. 
Cautionary Point: Before intervening, donors and other interested parties must 
accept that any initiative for national-level organization must come from pre-
existing provincial unions and must avoid providing funding directly to a national-
level association not grounded in lower-level associations. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 4: To help livestock producers make better use of the 
economic “stick” they control, interested organizations could provide herders 
unions with research findings, literature, and pamphlets on the fiscal importance of Organizational Context 
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livestock exports to the Burkinabè state.  By helping unions develop the 
“campaigning” skills needed to educate state officials, beyond the Ministry of 
Livestock, on the fiscal importance of livestock exports, donors or other interested 
organizations could help unions raise the political salience of livestock exports.  It 
is important, however, that unions focus their efforts on educating officials before 
they begin making demands; officials must know a group wields a fiscal “stick” 
before they can be intimidated by it. 
What about other livestock producers? 
The most vulnerable livestock producers are not included in peri-urban professional 
associations and are only marginally included in herders unions.  Many producers 
involved in sedentary livestock production of short-cycle ruminants, poultry, and pork 
live in an exceedingly precarious economic position.  They generally only control small 
numbers of livestock and spend a large part of their time growing subsistence crops.  
They cannot afford extensive inputs for their livestock or agricultural crops and likely 
do not have the time, means, or money to invest in any large-scale organizational 
efforts.  In addition, poor livestock producers are spread across almost all of Burkina 
Faso making organization exceedingly difficult.  Because they possess only small 
numbers of livestock, organization around this activity seems unlikely.  Usually these 
producers are not active in cash crop production either, making it hard to organize 
around any economic activity. 
Burkina’s very poor producers are responsible for producing the majority of livestock 
consumed domestically, but they are not politically important.  They lack any 
organizational base from which to negotiate with the state or use their control over 
domestic meat production to influence state policy.  Furthermore, it appears that 
Burkinabè politicians today are more focused on garnering foreign currency and export 
earnings than on production for the domestic market, making the control over 
domestic meat production of little political significance.  It is highly unlikely that poor 
producers will organize anytime in the near future to promote their own needs or 
even to facilitate the distribution of needed veterinary services.  Pro-poor policies will 
have to come from elsewhere.  This section has presented possible domestic allies in 
the promotion of pro-poor policies.  However, in order to appreciate the feasibility of 
various pro-poor policies, we must consider the role of the state, animal health 
providers, and market actors in the livestock sector. 
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STATE INTERVENTIONS, ANIMAL HEALTH AND LIVESTOCK MARKET 
CONDITIONS  
The first major state interventions in Burkina Faso’s livestock sector occurred under 
the French colonial government.  Beginning in the early 1950s, the colonial 
g o ve r nm e nt  t o o k  a n a ct ive  r o le  i n im p r o ving veterinary health across French West 
Africa (Landais 1990).  Following independence, the Burkinabè government moved 
beyond the animal health role played by the earlier colonial government into the 
commercial and market side of the livestock sector.  These interventions, as we will 
see, have had mixed consequences for the development of local and regional markets 
for Burkinabè livestock, as well as Burkinabè producers ability to meet market 
demand.   
During the colonial period and in the years immediately following Burkina Faso’s 
independence, state interventions focused a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  o n  disease prevention 
(Landais 1990).  The colonial government’s interventions in the commercial aspects of 
the livestock sector were limited.  The goals of early interventions were primarily to 
increase herd size and eliminate the most devastating epizootics, particularly those 
effecting cattle.  Colonial interventions were quite successful.  The quantity of cattle 
grew significantly during the colonial period and most major epizootics were brought 
under control (Tall 1999).  Until the droughts of the early 1970s, many observers 
hoped the sector would be able to sustain the impressive growth rates achieved under 
French colonial government (Landais 1990, 47-8).   
While the colonial government did work to develop the livestock sector, it focused 
primarily on developing agricultural crops for export, in particular cotton.  Livestock 
was never at the top of the colonial government’s agenda.  The colonial 
administration saw Burkina Faso primarily as a potential cotton growing area and as a 
source of labour for neighbouring colonies.  Upon independence, therefore, the new 
government inherited an economy dependant on cotton production and labour 
remittances.  Not surprisingly, the newly independent government tended to focus 
development efforts on improving cotton production, a ready source of needed export 
earnings.  Despite Burkina’s regional importance as a livestock producing country, its 
primary focus was not on developing the livestock sector. 
Burkinabè politics in the post-independence period was highly unstable.  In a mere 
twenty years, the presidency changed hands six times.  Only with Compaore’s rise to 
power in 1987 did the system begin to stabilize (Englebert 1996).  In this political 
environment, the government was not able to generate a clear development policy for 
the livestock sector.  While the sector experienced a succession of projects and 
limited interventions in the 1960s and 1970s, there was no universal development 
policy to speak of.  Furthermore, the remarkable progress in the control of epizootics 
under French colonial government began to slow and even reverse as a result of 
mismanagement by poorly funded, poorly managed government agencies (Tall 1999). 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Burkina Faso underwent what many have 
termed an internally-driven structural adjustment program.  The finance minister 
implemented a number of rigid fiscal policies that drastically reduced state 
expenditures.  The state’s fiscal and trade balance improved considerably from the 
immediate post-independence period.  Nonetheless, although good for the state as a 
whole these reforms were disastrous for many of the country’s most basic sectors, 
including livestock.  Faced with severe budget cuts, key government agencies like 
education, agriculture, and livestock, “ont consacré virtuellement tous leurs credits 
au paiement des salaries préférent laisser degrader l’équipement de State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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fonctionnement”
10  (Zagré 1994, 78).  This meant that the potential benefits of 
responsible management envisioned by the reforms did not crystallize in the livestock 
sector.  Instead the degradation of services experienced immediately after 
independence continued unabated.  By 1976, the Burkinabè government had 
abandoned the fiscal rigor of the adjustment period, but the fiscal indiscipline that 
followed did little to create the basis for long-term stability in the state 
administration (Zagré 1994). 
In 1980, the government disbanded the livestock agency created under the French 
colonial government and handed its tasks over to the Ministry of Rural Development.  
As a result, “livestock agents on the ground no longer had a direct tie to their superior 
in the capital” (Tall 1999, 1635).  This disconnect undermined the functional efficacy 
of the beleaguered livestock services’ efforts to control the spread of epizootics, so 
much so that Burkina Faso saw the resurgence of the African Rinderpest.  The 
government did not re-establish the livestock ministry until 1997.  Before the creation 
of the current Ministry of Livestock, livestock services were shuffled between 
government ministries for which livestock was only a secondary priority. 
The Burkinabè state like most other African states became directly involved in the 
provision of animal health services and supplies and in the marketing of livestock 
products in the 1970s.  Through two parastatal agencies, the Office national 
d’exploitation des ressources animales (ONERA) and the Office National 
d'Approvisionnement et de Distribution des Intrants Zootechniques et Vétérinaires 
(ONAVET), the government sought to stimulate the sector through state subsidization 
and control.  The government created ONERA in 1975 with the assistance of the 
Netherlands and Germany to facilitate the commercialization of livestock products; it 
dissolved the agency in 1988.  The government created ONAVET to import and 
distribute of veterinary medicine and supplies.  ONAVET lasted until 1998 when it was 
liquidated as part of Burkina Faso’s structural adjustment program. 
While state marketing boards such as ONERA were common across Africa into the 
1990s, their actual contribution in promoting and facilitating the production and sale 
of domestic crops was often dubious.  Frequently marketing boards actually served 
urban and political interests before those of crop producers.  By fixing product prices 
at lower-than-market rates or by distributing inputs based on political rather than 
economic calculations, marketing boards actually hurt producers in the long-run 
(Bates 1981). 
While the state’s success in directing the marketing of livestock products was limited 
at best, it did make important in-roads in basic animal health under the ONAVET.  
ONAVET proved to be effective (both in terms of cost and quality) at organizing the 
importation and distribution of veterinary medicine and supplies.  State veterinary 
agents further helped to meet animal health needs by providing basic veterinary 
services in rural areas.  Although animal health remained poor despite state 
interventions, most observers agree that under the ONAVET veterinary medicine and 
supplies were far more readily available than today.  According to one interviewee, 
the state imported twice as much medicine in the late 1980s as private importers do 
today.  And although basic medicines were offered to producers at lower-than-market 
prices, the agency remained profitable (IREC 2003).  ONAVET was able to use the sale 
of profitable medicines to subsidize unprofitable, but nonetheless necessary, basic 
medicines. 
In addition to ONAVET’s widespread provision of veterinary medicine, the state 
trained and employed veterinarians to provide animal health services across Burkina 
Faso.  While costly and ultimately of only moderate effectiveness, the public 
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veterinary program nonetheless helped to assure the provision of basic animal health 
services, particularly in areas which would not be attractive markets for private 
veterinarians. 
The Withdrawal of the State: Consequences for Animal Health 
While the Burkinabè government dissolved ONERA in 1988 in response to domestic 
considerations, its later decision to liquidate ONAVET in 1998 grew directly from the 
requirements of the structural adjustment program it undertook with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.  In the case of ONERA, the withdrawal of the 
state from livestock marketing does not appear to have been particularly negative for 
livestock producers.  As argued below, Burkina Faso’s livestock sector has remarkably 
well-developed commercial systems already in place in the private sector.  Addressing 
the weaknesses of the existing commercial systems does not require direct state 
control over the commercial activities of the livestock sector.  The dissolution of 
ONAVET, on the other hand, has left Burkinabè producers with limited access to 
veterinary medicine.  The privatization of veterinary service provision has equally 
limited many producers’ access to veterinary services.   
According to most observers, ONAVET was dissolved too rapidly; reformers paid little 
attention to its relative success at providing necessary public goods for the livestock 
sector (IREC 2003).  Similarly, the privatization of veterinary services is argued to 
have occurred before the private veterinary sector was capable of meeting the needs 
of livestock producers.  Many interviewees argued that the international financial 
institutions responsible for setting the conditions of Burkina Faso’s structural 
adjustment program forced the government to adopt one-size-fits-all policies that 
ignored the particularities of Burkina Faso’s livestock sector.  It is far from clear that 
the state’s partial withdrawal (it still fulfils many services but with a reduced budget) 
from providing animal health and medicine services has helped poor producers. 
The privatization of the importation of veterinary medicine proceeded rapidly after 
the liquidation of ONAVET, but according to observers in the sector, the private 
importers that emerged to replace ONAVET face serious difficulties in securing 
adequate medicine to cover current demand.  Five factors have made it difficult for 
private importers to meet producer demand.  First, while ONAVET had well-
established connections to pharmaceutical companies in Europe and elsewhere which 
allowed them to import on credit and at preferential rates, Burkina’s new import 
businesses must pay pharmaceutical companies up-front for medicines.  In addition, 
because they are importing significantly smaller quantities than ONAVET, they do not 
benefit from the most attractive bulk rates.  Second, private importers do not have 
sufficient capital to purchase large quantities of medicine, making it difficult to 
purchase at bulk rates and to meet demand.  Third, constrained by the purchasing 
power of Burkinabè producers, importers operate on small profit margins making it 
risky to provide medicines to veterinarians on credit.  As a result, importers sell only 
to veterinarians who are able to pay up front for medicine.  This limits veterinarians’ 
and indirectly clients’ access to veterinary products.  Fourth, licensed private 
importers must compete against informal, unregulated importers selling fraudulent 
medicine at discounted prices.  Finally, private importers are not able to secure credit 
from formal financial institutions.  According to one importer, banks will not offer 
credit in the livestock sector.  This importer worries that without some means of 
increasing capital, importers will not be able to meet existing demands for veterinary 
medicine. 
Beyond merely meeting producer demand, however, there is some concern that 
private importers are not importing the vaccines required to control epizootics.  As 
one importer noted, trypanocides account for 80 percent of his business.  In order to 
remain economically viable, private importers must focus on meeting consumer State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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demands for trypanocides which producers are willing to pay for because they provide 
visible benefits.  Vaccinations, on the other hand, rarely produce visible benefits and 
producers can frequently “free ride” on the vaccination efforts of other producers.
11  
In circumstances like this, the private market may not adequately provide public, 
collective goods. 
According to interviewees, the state has not entirely withdrawn from the importation 
of veterinary medicines.  The Programme de Développement des Animaux Villageois 
(PDAV) is the largest vaccine importer (almost exclusively of vaccines for poultry and 
small ruminants) in Burkina.  Although the PDAV purchases vaccines through an open-
bidding system, local importers cannot compete with the bids of foreign companies.  
The PDAV in turn sells these vaccines at a discounted rate to producers at the village 
level.  In the market for small ruminant and poultry vaccines, private importers must 
compete against vaccines provided at a discounted rate by the PDAV.  However, it is 
important to note that private importers show very little interest in the small 
ruminant and poultry vaccination market, concentrating their sales and imports on 
medicine intended for cattle. 
The distribution and sale of veterinary medicines and the provision of veterinary 
services in the post-privatization period also raises important doubts about the private 
sectors current ability to meet animal health needs in Burkina Faso today.  According 
to interviewees, the privatization program envisioned by the World Bank failed to 
consider the difficulties involved in moving from an entirely state-run approach to 
animal health toward a private veterinary system.  Many believe the state disengaged 
from precisely the services it needed to continue to provide (training and public 
health preventative services) while remaining active in those services which should 
have been handed over to private veterinarians (sale of pharmaceuticals), or as this 
paper argues, paraprofessionals.  At the same time, observers note a rise in the illegal 
trade of veterinary medicine, often times undertaken by former auxiliary agents 
trained by the state in earlier vaccination and animal health campaigns but now 
operating on their own (IEPC 2005, 31). 
As in much of Africa, Burkina Faso’s private veterinarians lack the capital and 
financial resources needed to establish private practices (Leonard 2000).  Those 
veterinarians who have successfully established practices have generally done so 
thanks to credit granted by lending institutions under credit assurance programs 
offered by external donors.  In order to repay these credits, however, private 
veterinarians must be able to generate a profit by providing veterinary services.  In 
reality, veterinarians make little profit off services; rather they rely upon the sale of 
veterinary medicine to cover the costs of operating a business and travelling to areas 
where producers live.  As a result, the fact that state agents, most of whom are 
paraprofessionals, continue to sell veterinary medicines frustrates private 
veterinarians.  While private veterinarians must charge enough for medicines to cover 
business and transportation expenses, state agents can undercharge for medicines as 
the government has already covered their transportation and living expenses.   
Ironically, these state agents are located primarily in the areas of the central plateau 
region and the west, those areas in which veterinarian practices might otherwise be 
most viable (IEPC 2005).  The provision of veterinary medicines by Burkinabè state 
agents, either working directly for the Minister of Livestock or in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which is quite common in isolated areas, creates unfair 
competition for veterinarians attempting to build up private practices. 
While the state has not entirely withdrawn from the provision of veterinary medicine, 
the government has stopped hiring veterinarians, except in special circumstances.  It 
has also stopped funding the training of veterinarians.  According to one informant, 
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the state no longer gives students scholarships to attend the regional veterinary school 
in Dakar, Senegal.  For students who are not guaranteed employment with the state 
and for whom private veterinary practice may not seem particularly promising, the 
financial investment required to attend the regional veterinary school may appear too 
burdensome.  As one observer with extensive professional experience in the Ministry 
of Livestock argued, there is an alarming decline in the number of Burkinabè students 
pursing veterinary careers.  Something must be done to ensure that Burkina Faso does 
not lose this professional capacity for it is fundamental to the prevention of epizootics 
and the development of the sector. 
Multiple observers argued that the state is slow to respond to epizootics.  In one 
current example, the state does not appear to have made an adequate effort to stop 
the spread of African swine fever.  Officials in the Ministry of Livestock argue that the 
ministry responded as quickly as possible to the recent threat of African swine fever 
crossing into Burkina from neighbouring countries.  But many observers argue that 
despite the clear threat of an outbreak, the ministry was slow to react and has not 
made necessary efforts to limit its spread within Burkina.  Whether the spread of 
African swine fever is the result of negligence on the part of state agents or 
institutional incapacity is not clear, but one state official noted that the state was 
slow to declare the presence of African swine fever because it did not have the 
facilities needed to test for the disease.  Furthermore, although the state has banned 
the transportation of pigs within Burkina and ordered producers to keep them 
enclosed to avoid disease spread, observers on the ground believe the state does not 
have the means to enforce these regulations.  While anecdotal, the spread of African 
swine fever offers a stark warning that state livestock agencies may not be capable of 
providing the basic public animal health services, such as the control of epizootics, 
which the private sector cannot be expected to provide.  Ultimately if the state and 
nascent private sector are not able to provide the basic animal health requirements 
needed to stabilize and increase livestock production, Burkina Faso’s livestock 
producers and the supply of livestock suffer.   
Although we have seen that state agents must refrain from selling veterinary medicine 
if private veterinarians are to succeed, it is also apparent that the state must play 
some role in ensuring that basic animal health services are offered, both to protect 
against epizootics and to facilitate economic development of the sector.  The market 
cannot fulfil this role independently because private veterinarians cannot make a 
reasonable living by focusing on basic, rural animal health services.  The 
transportation costs are too high and producers too poor to support a private 
veterinary practice.  Private veterinarians therefore congregate in urban and peri-
urban areas where clients can pay higher prices for their services.   
Considering these constraints, how can the Burkinabè state both privatize the 
veterinary sector and correct for market failures that leave basic animal health needs 
unfulfilled? 
This paper proposes that the system needs to be re-examined and the states’ role 
reconsidered.  For any reform to be feasible it must encourage privatization or it will 
not garner support from the World Bank and other donors.  However, successful 
reforms will also have to address the lack of market incentives for private 
veterinarians to serve low-income, low-input producers in rural areas and for private 
importers to import vaccinations, particularly for poultry and small-ruminants. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 5: Clearly, the current private import system is not helping 
veterinarians and producers to secure the medicines they want and need, nor are 
private importers accumulating the capital needed to expand their import 
businesses.  This paper recommends that a more in-depth study of the constraints 
facing import businesses be conducted in o r d e r  t o  g e n e r a t e  feasible means for 
increasing capital and capacity in the import business.  Possible recommendations 
include encouraging pharmaceutical companies to create partnerships with State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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importers or encouraging the state to guarantee a certain portion of the debt 
accrued from imports until import companies are able to generate needed capital. 
It is unreasonable to expect private veterinarians to ensure that animal health 
services and medicines reach poor, rural producers and that public animal health 
services be carried out across Burkina Faso.  Reliance on private veterinarians would 
“[raise] the costs of care to the level necessary to compensate a university graduate 
and [tend] to make it financially accessible only to fully commercialized producers, 
leaving the mass of quasi-subsistence herders outside the net of protection” (Leonard 
2000, 22).  Para-professionals with some training in animal health must be used if 
services are to be provided to all producers.  Many observers argue that 
paraprofessionals should not be allowed to sell certain medicines because they lack 
diagnostic skills.  According to this logic, veterinary presence is still preferable in rural 
areas.  However, paraprofessionals already provide many veterinary medicines, and 
most medicines dispensed in rural areas are common vaccinations or are intended to 
treat easily identifiable problems.  Furthermore, for all of the reasons outlines above, 
we cannot expect private veterinarians to travel to all rural areas to sell medicine.  
Veterinarians do not have a comparative advantage in the sale of medicine in rural 
areas.  As C. Ly (2000) demonstrated in the Senegalese case, producers make little 
distinction between veterinarians and paraprofessionals when purchasing veterinary 
medicines and are unwilling to pay higher prices to receive medicines from 
veterinarians.  It therefore makes economic and practical sense to allow 
paraprofessionals, trained by the state, to provide preventative and basic curative 
services in rural areas while leaving veterinarians to perform specialized services only 
they are qualified to conduct (and for which producers will pay).  These 
paraprofessionals must, however, move out of the direct employment of the state and 
under the supervision of private veterinarians in order to facilitate the privatization 
process. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 6: In order to facilitate the privatization of veterinary 
services while retaining basic national animal health preventative capacities, the 
government could contract private paraprofessionals to provide preventative 
services in specified geographical areas.  In exchange for providing preventative 
services, these paraprofessionals would be granted the right to sell basic curative 
medicines to local producers in the area. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 7: To guarantee that these paraprofessionals receive 
appropriate veterinary supervision and that veterinarians’ specialized skills are 
promoted in rural areas, the government could contract with private veterinarians 
to supervise the paraprofessionals and to track public animal health concerns, such 
as the spread of epizootics, in specified areas.  In exchange for their supervisory 
role, private veterinarians could receive transportation subsidies that would allow 
them to provide curative services at a reduced fee while travelling for supervision 
purposes.  This monopoly on curative service in a given area would help assure 
veterinarians a sound financial base for their private practice. 
Cautionary Point: Both of the entry points offered raise the important risk of 
distorting markets through government-sponsored monopolies.  However, certain 
institutional guarantees could be implemented to protect against the potential harms 
of this system.  Leonard (2000)describes two possible mechanisms for limiting the 
nefarious effects of monopoly.  First, short term contracts could be implemented that 
would require paraprofessionals and veterinarians to bid competitively for their 
contracts every two to five years (Leonard 2000, 27).  Of course some worry that this 
system would create too much roo m for corruption and not enough focus on local 
service provision, therefore a second guarantee is recommended.  A mechanism must 
be created to ensure client involvement in the making of contracts; one possibility is 
t o  a l l o w  c l i e n t s  t o  v o t e  o n  p r e f e r r e d  c o n t r a c t  p r o v i d e r s .   T o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e s e  State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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paraprofessionals respect market rates for the curative medicines, clients should be 
provided by either the state or a professional association with a list of market prices.
12   
•  Strategic Entry Point 8: To ensure that Burkina Faso retains a critical mass of 
veterinarians to supervise the work of paraprofessionals, interested donors or 
organizations could implement a scholarship program to sponsor Burkinabè students 
interested in attending the regional veterinary school in Dakar, Senegal.  The 
scholarship could require students to return to Burkina Faso to practice veterinary 
medicine for a given amount of time. 
Meeting Demand in the Market for Livestock Products 
By all indications, the most significant difficulties facing Burkina Faso’s livestock 
sector from a market point of view appear to stem from the limited supply of 
livestock products rather than weak demand, particularly for the poultry sub-sector.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, an over-valued exchange rate and the importation of 
cheap livestock products from the European Union by West African countries drove 
down demand for Burkinabè livestock products in the West African region (McCarthy 
2004).  Since the 1990s, however, the devaluation of the CFA and anti-dumping 
restrictions have helped to dramatically increase demand for Burkinabè livestock 
products in the regional market.  Yet, as addressed below, high transportation and 
transaction costs, have limited Burkinabè producers’ ability to supply the regional 
market.  Furthermore, domestic consumption, particularly of small-ruminants and 
short-cycle livestock, has increased with population growth.  Almost all of the 
interviewees consulted for this study felt that the largest challenge facing the sector 
was to meet existing demands, either by increasing production or facilitating 
exportation.  Few believed that efforts needed to be made to stimulate demand for 
livestock products (see below, Improving Existing Commercial Systems). 
Although it is clear that the sector suffers a deficit in the supply of livestock products, 
it is far from clear how to go about rectifying this situation.  Perhaps one of the 
largest policy debates at present among state officials, donors, and producers is how 
to go about making Burkina Faso’s livestock sector more productive.  Pasture 
depletion, increased land tenure disputes, and the expansion of agriculture into 
traditional livestock areas make herd expansion an unfeasible way to increase 
livestock supply.  Some type of intensification is needed.  While all actors agree on 
this point, every actor has his or her own definition of intensification. 
Defining Intensification 
The Burkinabè state faces a dilemma in the rural world.  It is difficult for the state 
agents to regulate competition between livestock producers and agricultural 
producers because they must work to increase both crop and livestock production.  
Furthermore, state officials do not have a reliable, clear set of state laws to consult in 
regulating competition.  If officials want to meet domestic food consumption needs 
and boast exports, they must figure out a means of promoting both livestock and 
agricultural development.  It is not surprising therefore that consecutive Burkinabè 
governments and their international and bi-lateral partners have placed an increasing 
emphasis on the intensification of production. 
According to Breusers (1999), the Burkinabè state and many of its foreign partners 
have come to see intensification as necessarily requiring the sedentarization of 
livestock and agriculture.  He argues that many policy makers believe Burkina Faso’s 
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traditional extensive agricultural and livestock systems to be incompatible with the 
environmental difficulties facing Burkina today.  In order to generate sufficient animal 
and agricultural crops to meet domestic demand, policy makers promote “mixed 
farming”.  Mixed farming or “the integration of agriculture and animal husbandry—and 
the intensification of both—on the level of individual farms … constitutes the 
foundation of agricultural and economic progress” (Breusers 1999, 392).  However, the 
concept of integration at the individual farm level is at odds with historical social 
practices in Burkina which emphasize societal-level integration.  Furthermore, several 
interviewees believe that state officials see intensification as synonymous with 
modernization.  The state, they argue, promotes modern livestock production 
techniques which frequently rely upon the use of exotic breeds as the key step in 
intensifying production while skipping small-scale interventions at the local level 
which could have more widespread advantages. 
Many interviewees see intensification as the gradual introduction of improved, low-
input techniques into existing production systems.  These interviewees and 
researchers argue that there is no indication that modern production techniques or 
even mixed-farming are ultimately more productive in the Burkinabè context.  All 
factors considered, transhumant methods of raising livestock appear to be more 
productive in Burkina Faso than sedentary production.  As Breusers argues, Burkina 
Faso has always been home to a system of mixed farming, but this mixed farming 
occurs at a societal level not at the level of the individual family farm.  There is no 
real evidence to demonstrate that developing mixed family farms produces significant 
benefits over the promotion of societal-level mixed farming (Breusers 1999, , 392).  
Furthermore, interviewees continue to emphasize that intensification is only viable if 
based on low-cost interventions that are adapted to the realities of rural Burkinabè 
production. 
In a country as poor as Burkina Faso, the feasibility of modern, intensive livestock 
production meeting the country’s consumption needs and improving rural producers’ 
livelihoods is probably limited at best.  Yet the idea has at different times been well-
received by certain state officials.  As already noted, the previous minister of 
livestock was strongly committed to the development of modern production 
techniques, particularly in the dairy sector.  Furthermore, one interviewee told of the 
state sponsored importation of exotic cattle from Brazil to jump-start Burkina Faso’s 
diary industry.  The dairy industry does not appear to have significantly improved as a 
result of this effort or artificial insemination programs.  By all indication, these efforts 
are focused primarily on subsidizing well-connected investors in the sector, not on the 
long-term development of the livestock sector.  Fortunately, there have been few 
major fiascos in the development of modern livestock production in Burkina. 
While neighbouring countries have seen massive sums of money lost in dubious 
livestock intensification programs, Burkina Faso’s government has been relatively 
cautious in its spending on large-scale intensification programs.  It is not entirely clear 
how or why the government has avoided the types of fiascos that struck neighbouring 
countries.  Englebert (1996) argues that Burkina Faso simply has not had the money to 
invest in large-scale development projects.  Others believe that the Burkinabè state 
simply has its “pieds sur terre” or feet on the ground.  Still others see the state’s 
pragmatism as a legacy of the Sankara era.  Regardless of the reasons for its caution, 
the Burkinabè state has not engaged in any large-scale modernization or serious 
intensification efforts in the livestock sector despite official proclamations of the 
importance of intensifying livestock production. 
Land Tenure, Pasture Depletion, and Agricultural Expansion 
As noted earlier, the push for intensification is largely a response to environmental 
degradation and its consequent crop insecurity and reduction in pasture area.   
However, extensive production methods are not the sole cause for the degradation of State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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Burkina Faso’s natural resources.  Burkina Faso’s land tenure regime, state policy, and 
the cycle of droughts in the 1970s and 1980s have all played a part in the degradation 
of Burkinabè resources.  In order to grasp the difficulties poor livestock producers face 
in securing pasture and water for their livestock, it is necessary to briefly explore the 
tensions created by vague land tenure laws, depleted natural resources, and 
agricultural expansion in Burkina Faso. 
In the years building up to Burkina Faso’s first major drought in the early 1970s, its 
human and livestock populations rapidly expanded thanks to human and animal health 
advances.  To feed these populations, producers of both crops and livestock expanded 
their production to new areas placing stress on Burkina’s natural resources.  With the 
droughts of the 1970s and even more so the droughts of the 1980s, pastoral 
populations who had lost significant amounts of livestock during the droughts, 
migrated more-or-less permanently from northern and central Burkina to the 
southern, south-western and western regions.  In these more hospitable climates, 
livestock populations quickly recovered to near their pre-drought levels.  The drought-
era migration was so marked that the southwestern area is now home to the majority 
of Burkina’s livestock.  
Simultaneously, agricultural migrants from Burkina’s central and eastern areas have 
moved into the southern, southwestern and western areas of the country in search of 
fertile land (Tallet 1996, 120).  These migrants have claimed land on the peripheries 
of existing villages and towns—land previously ceded to migrant pastoral populations.  
In some instances, migrant farmers, in order to increase the land available for 
agricultural endeavours, have destroyed the local forests upon which pastoral 
producers depend.  While land conflicts in the area are often framed as native versus 
stranger conflicts, many of Burkina’s fiercest land conflicts have occurred between 
agricultural migrants and pastoral populations (see above discussion of Mossi migrants 
and Fulani pastoralists).  Native versus stranger conflicts also arise, particularly in 
areas where a process of dual immigration has created high demand for available land 
(Ouédraogo 2003b). 
Existing land tenure laws offer few reliable mechanisms for reconciling these 
conflicts.  Officially rural land tenure is governed by the 1985 document 
Reorganisation Agraire et Fonciere (RAF), last revised in 1998.  The first official 
document designed to regulate land use in rural areas, the RAF nationalized all 
Burkinabè land making it part of the national domain.  However beyond nationalizing 
ultimate control over the land, the RAF offered little practical guidance in the 
management of rural land.  According to most interviewees, the RAF simply is not 
applied.  Instead, local customary authorities continue to allocate land based on 
customary rules.  Even state officials charged with applying the RAF employ customary 
practices when attempting to acquire land for their own use (Ouédraogo Unknown, 
13).  The “new stakeholders” responsible for the creation of Burkina’s newest 
intensive farms also rely upon customary land tenure agreements to gain access to 
land.  However, these customary practices offer no permanent security making it 
impossible to access credit or make large investments on the land.  More importantly 
for poor livestock producers, the system makes it difficult for actors traditionally 
excluded from the bodies responsible for distributing land to make formal claims to 
the land they occupy.  When customary practices coexist with an inapplicable legal 
land tenure regime, it becomes difficult for state agents to enforce existing laws and 
procedures.  As previously argued, livestock producers frequently fare poorly in the 
customary division of land; whereas, formal state law often grants them rights to the 
land.  If state law is inapplicable or ignored, ultimately its potential beneficiaries will 
see very little real improvement.  Furthermore, when potential beneficiaries such as 
livestock producers take their land tenure disputes to the state level, the rulings 
made by state agents often appear “illegal” to local populations accustomed to 
governing land tenure through customary channels.  This generates further tension 
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The RAF envisioned the creation of a gestion des terroirs approach to the 
management of rural land which would empower local stakeholders to make decisions 
regarding the use of local land.  The approach was meant to expand the realm of 
stakeholders involved in making land tenure decisions beyond customary authorities.  
This approach has had mixed results due to three factors: resistance among customary 
authorities, lack of funding, and unequal representation of local stakeholders on the 
committees responsible for regulating land use.  Customary authorities have perceived 
of the gestion des terroirs approach as an encroachment on their inherited right and 
obligation to care for the land of their ancestors.  However, with concerted effort on 
the part of state agents, project leaders, and other local authorities, committees have 
been created to implement the gestion des terroirs approach.  It appears therefore 
that customary authorities are not the principal hurdle in the application of this 
approach.  Rather, a constant lack of funding has limited the application of the 
gestion des terroirs approach to a few experimental areas.  The state has never 
funded the widespread application of the program.  Instead, the approach has spread 
only to areas where international or other donors have been willing to sponsor its 
application.  However beneficial the approach may be, it simply is not a reality for 
many Burkinabè.  Many donors and Burkinabè politicians today argue that one priority 
in the state’s current decentralization program must be the spread of the gestion des 
terroirs approach.  Before embracing this prescription for rural Burkina’s land tenure 
woes, it is important to realize that the gestion des terroirs approach has not always 
lived up to its promise of incorporating all relevant stakeholders.  Among those most 
apt to be under-represented or unrepresented on decision-making committees are 
women, young people and pastoral producers, all of which constitute the most 
vulnerable producers in the livestock sector. 
To generate recommendations for improving the position of poor livestock producers 
in conflicts over land tenure would require a more in depth examination of land 
tenure issues than this study can provide.  This brief survey is intended simply to alert 
the interested observer to the fact that land tenure conflicts must be addressed if we 
are to improve poor producers’ livelihoods.  Observers believe that while complex, 
the issue of land tenure is a politically tractable.  The fact that Burkina Faso does not 
have a class of large land owners bodes well for the future negotiation of land tenure 
laws.  While the current debates on decentralization and land distribution processes 
often fall outside of the classic rubric of livestock policy, these state policies will have 
lasting consequences for the most vulnerable producers of the livestock sector.  
Improving Existing Commercial Systems 
Poor livestock producers in Burkina Faso are fortunate to have relatively well-
developed, functional commercial systems in which to sell their products.  The 
informal system which has developed over time to move poultry from the small-scale 
producer to the urban consumer is remarkably well-adapted to Burkinabè realities.  
Approximately 25 percent of the meat consumed in Burkina Faso’s urban areas comes 
from small-scale (generally poor) poultry producers in rural areas.  Through a system 
of bicycle-based collection, moped transportation, and street vendors, rural poultry is 
transported from the smallest farm to even the largest hotel.
13  Similarly, meat 
producers are able to tap into an informal but nonetheless effective, if often 
economically inefficient, commercial network to transport live animals to consumers 
across the West African sub-region.  Both of these commercial systems offer a 
promising start for improving poor producers’ livelihoods through minimal 
interventions, most of which do not require direct state action. 
                                                 
13 Many studies of poultry production have been undertaken in Burkina Faso, (Ouédraogo 2003a) and (Kondombo et al. 2003) 
provide good starting points to examine this sector. State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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Small-scale poultry production is central to the daily survival of Burkina Faso’s rural 
population.  According to Zoundi (1997), this production is the principal source of 
daily revenue to meet family needs in certain areas of Burkina Faso.  Poultry from 
small-scale familial production not only helps producers, it also drives a commercial 
enterprise that employs vendors and transporters across Burkina.  Approximately 
20,000 chickens and guinea hens reach Ouagadougou each day, a commercial flux 
worth 5,840 billion FCFA per year to rural producers.  Another 5 billion FCFA per year 
are distributed among the commercial actors in the poultry trade (Ouédraogo 2003a, 
6).  Considering that this commercial trade is largely informal and requires little to no 
direct state support, its performance is remarkable.   
Burkina Faso’s poultry producers have thus far been fortunate that frozen poultry 
imports have not had a significant impact on the domestic market for poultry.  Despite 
the fact that Burkina Faso applies the same import regulations and tariffs on poultry 
imports as neighbouring UEMOA countries, frozen poultry imports have not flooded 
into Burkina Faso as they have neighbouring countries.  It remains unclear exactly how 
Burkina Faso has avoided these imports, but most observers believe, its distance from 
the closest port has been highly important. 
Despite the poultry systems performance and lack of direct competition, the system is 
not currently meeting market demand for poultry, particularly at holiday periods.   
Interviewees involved in the commercial system and in state administration believe 
that the inability to meet market demand arises from the limited supply of poultry, 
not from failures in the system of commercialization.  Most interviewees believe the 
current commercial system is capable of expanding to deal with greater supply and 
demand.  However, at the producer level, increasing production is challenging.   
Disease continues to wipe out a large proportion of rural poultry.  Producers are 
unwilling, or unable because of more pressing financial demands, to make investments 
in disease prevention.   
Although the state has sought to withdraw itself from the provision of veterinary 
services, providing discounted vaccinations against common diseases, such as 
Newcastle disease, helps poor producers to take advantage of the existing commercial 
system.  The Burkinabè government has already shown a commitment to promotion of 
small, rural poultry production by funding the Programme de Développement des 
Animaux Villageois (PDAV).  When French funding for the program was cut, program 
advocates were able to convince the Burkinabè government to provide the funding 
necessary to continue the program.  It is quite rare for any donor-funded program to 
continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.  For a program designed explicitly 
to meet the needs of poor-producers to secure national funding through the political 
process by petitioning members of government and parliament is remarkable.   
However many observers feel the PDAV, despite its strengths, needs to work towards 
its own demise by facilitating the emergence of private mechanisms capable of 
meeting the health needs of small-scale producers.  Because of the apparent political 
power of the PDAV and its supporters, it offers a potential leader in the process of 
contracting out preventative and veterinary medicine functions proposed in strategic 
entry points six through eight.  Because of its size, PDAV is able to import vaccinations 
for small ruminants and poultry, particularly for Newcastle disease, and basic curative 
medicines at preferential rates.  Furthermore, it has the facilities to store medicines 
at appropriate temperatures and the means to distribute medicines to rural areas.   
•  Strategic Entry Point 9: In order to increase the production of village poultry, 
vaccinations and basic medicines must be made available to producers at 
accessible prices.  If the PDAV facilities could be used to provide preventative 
medicine to contracted paraprofessionals at competitive rates, this would allow 
private paraprofessionals to pass on the price advantages offered by the PDAV’s 
economy of scale while still operating as private actors. 
In several interviews, participants in Burkina’s cattle and small ruminant sub-sector 
complained of the lack of state assistance in the commercialization of livestock.   State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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These complaints contrasted to the written documentation and outside observations 
of the effectiveness of the cattle and small-ruminant commercial system.  In reality 
both opinions are legitimate.  The existing commercial system for cattle and small-
ruminants shows remarkable flexibility and resilience, especially in light of the limited 
credit available to commercial actors in the livestock sector and the poor state of the 
sectors’ transportation infrastructure.  However, the lack of credit, poor 
infrastructure and limited purchasing power of Burkinabè consumers put a damper on 
the entire system, leaving people within it frustrated and vulnerable and undermining 
the systems’ ability to meet regional demand. 
In reality the cattle and small ruminant commercial system is composed of at least 
two different commercial systems.  The extended commercial system whose ultimate 
market is frequently neighbouring countries relies upon intermediaries to connect 
producers and consumers; whereas, in the direct commercial system producers sell 
directly to consumers for local consumption.  Each system accounts for approximately 
50 percent of the cattle and small ruminants sold each year, although poor producers 
tend to be more active in the direct commercial system.  The direct commercial 
system offers poor producers a way to reduce the personal risks associated with the 
extended system, but ultimately provides less room for growth and development than 
the extended commercial system. 
The extended commercial system is the more formal of the two systems.  Because the 
system involves large-scale exportation, m a n y  o f  i t s  a g e n t s  m u s t  p a y  e x p o r t  a n d  
import taxes, license fees, etc.  As a result, the Burkinabè state is able to draw 
r e v e n u e  f r o m  t h i s  c o m m e r c i a l  s y s t e m .   When the state considers the economic 
benefits of the livestock trade, it is primarily in terms, therefore, of this extended 
system.  While the state benefits from the formality of the system, system agents are 
not receiving the benefits normally associated with legal formality.  Though the 
system is more formal than its direct counterpart, agents in this system are not able 
to access formal bank credit or credit from the state’s agricultural credit union.  Even 
at the highest levels of this commercial system, traders and butchers find the caisse 
national de crédit agricole quite reticent to provide funding in the livestock sector.  
Furthermore, observers also believe that the state is not reinvesting the money 
obtained from exporters in the infrastructure exporters rely upon—roads, border 
crossings, etc.  Beyond the formal taxation imposed on exports, exporters in the 
extended commercial system face what UEMOA officials label “irregular” taxation.  At 
many border crossings, exporters and transhumant producers are forced to make side-
payments to border control officials.  However, the UEMOA is initiating a program 
which with the proper resources may help root out these “irregular” taxes. 
Because the extended commercial system is linked to regional markets, it can drive 
growth in Burkina’s livestock sector in response to regional demand.  Burkina’s local 
market is sharply constrained by the limited buying power of Burkinabè residents, 
while this creates a strong market for poultry because of its small size and low cost, it 
limits the market for cattle and small ruminants.  The extended commercial system, 
however, allows local producers to profit from increased buying power and demand in 
neighbouring countries.  Furthermore, the extended commercial system displays much 
flexibility in responding to regional markets.  For example, when the conflict in 
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire caused the government to close the Burkina-Côte d’Ivoire 
border, exporters were able to reorient exports toward Ghana before incurring 
massive losses.  When the conflict made transportation by road too dangerous 
exporters moved toward train-based transportation. 
While the flexible extended commercial system offers room for growth and expansion 
because of its connections to external markets, it is not a particularly hospitable 
system for poor producers.  In this system, the ability for poor producers to receive 
needed payment for their livestock depends on market conditions not only in Burkina 
but abroad, on the survival of livestock when transported over long distances, and 
therefore, on road conditions, political stability, and even weather conditions.  Poor State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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producers are vulnerable for two related reasons.  First, according to interviewees, 
producers frequently sell their animals on credit to trusted intermediaries who are 
responsible for securing payment from other agents higher up in the commercial 
system.  However, intermediaries find it difficult to fulfil these guarantees when 
animal loses, market conditions, or political conditions prevent the last agents in the 
commercial chain from selling the animal.  Whenever significant losses occur at the 
highest levels of the commercial chain, the consequences are filtered back down all 
the way to the poorest and most vulnerable producers.  Second, even when producers 
are paid up front, intermediaries are highly responsive to market conditions.  All 
actors in the commercial system operate on very small margins of profit and must 
absorb significant risk in any transaction; therefore, they are very careful to respond 
immediately to market conditions.  Frequently this means limiting the amount of 
livestock they purchase.  For poor producers who generally sell only when they need 
money, the inability to sell at any given time can have disastrous consequences. 
To avoid these risks, poor producers often chose to sell in the direct commercial 
system.  While this may assure their ability to sell at a given moment and limit the 
risks associated with selling on credit, the market for local consumption is limited 
making it unlikely this system will expand. Furthermore, producers do not receive 
significantly larger profits in this system than those available in the extended 
commercial system.  By selling through the direct system, producers avoid the risks 
associated with exportation, but they also miss out on possible benefits. 
Although poor producers remain vulnerable under the current extended commercial 
system, this paper advocates interventions in this system nonetheless.  The system’s 
formality means that the state stands to benefit from its expansion.  The fiscal rents 
afforded by the formal system may generate political interest in assisting this system.  
Furthermore, the formal nature of the system means that at the highest levels 
commercial actors are registered, regulated, and officially recognized.  This legal 
status may help actors in the formal system obtain credit from formal institutions.  By 
all indication, increasing the capital available to merchants at the top of this system 
could have positive effects down to even the smallest producers. 
Currently merchants do not operate with profit margins large enough to allow them to 
absorb losses, instead these losses are passed down to producers.  As noted earlier, 
merchants in this system operate bear significant risks; however, risk-reducing 
strategies, such as investing in better modes of transportation, expanding to new 
markets, or improving the state of slaughterhouses, are often too costly for merchants 
to undertake.  Yet formal lending institutions are highly reticent to offer credit to 
anyone in the livestock sector.  Banks and credit unions refuse almost categorically to 
offer credit when it is not secured by immovable assets.  Banks fail to recognize that 
cattle themselves constitute one of the most important assets in Burkina Faso.   
Ironically, state officials, businessmen, and according to one interviewee, even 
bankers themselves, invest heavily in cattle, preferring this traditional investment 
over the formal banking system.  Yet banks continue to shy away from the livestock 
sector. 
Observers believe that the expansion of the extended commercial system requires an 
infusion of capital.  This is particularly true for merchants seeking to improve 
transportation and slaughterhouse conditions.  Informal credit systems already exist to 
meet some merchants’ capital requirements, but all interviewees agree the system is 
not meeting existing needs. 
•  Strategic Entry Point 10: Increasing the capacity and reliability of the extended 
commercial system likely requires that credit be extended to actors at the highest 
levels of the formal commercial system.  This paper recommends that someone 
with competence in the field undertake a study of the feasibility of developing a 
credit program for the commercial system.  Considering the position of formal 
financial institutions, the most politically feasible program would likely build on 
the existing informal system of credit provision.  State Interventions, Animal Health, and Livestock Market Conditions 
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Two other priorities deserve mention although they cannot properly be thought of as 
entry points.  First, the state of transportation and border crossings in the region 
currently results in unnecessary costs for Burkinabè exporters.  Any improvements in 
transportation and the regulation of borders would facilitate the livestock trade, 
decreasing the risks and costs associated with exportation.  Second, over time the war 
in Côte d’Ivoire could constitute one of the most serious dampers on the development 
of Burkina’s livestock sector.  Even if Burkinabè exporters are able to direct livestock 
exports toward other countries in the region, the Ivoirian market remains the key 
market for Burkinabè exports.
14 
Conclusion 
The Burkinabè state’s role in providing animal health has shrunk in recent years, 
leaving the livestock supply vulnerable to epizootics and basic health problems which 
the private sector is either not capable of, or interested in, preventing.  Private, 
donor or state interventions are needed to increase the presence of veterinarians in 
the country and to improve the state’s ability to provide basic public goods, such as 
the control of epizootics.  Furthermore, we have seen that the lack of effective state 
policy for regulating land use ultimately has hurt poor livestock producers.  On the 
other hand, private actors in Burkina’s livestock sector appear quite capable of 
developing appropriate commercial systems for the marketing of livestock products 
with only minimal state or donor assistance. 
 
                                                 
14 In 2000 at the beginning of the conflict, approximately 50 percent of all cattle and small ruminants were sent to Côte 
d’Ivoire (MRA 2001, 71).  
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PRESSURE POINTS: POWER IN BURKINABÈ POLITICS 
Residents of European and North American countries are accustomed to political 
systems with multiple pressure points.  Political parties, elected officials, appointed 
officials, and even career civil servants can all serve as targets for changing public 
policy and state action.  At local and national levels, citizens, interest groups and 
businesses seeking change can apply pressure to political and administrative 
structures.  In Burkina Faso, as in much of Africa, the pressure points available for 
changing policy are frequently more limited.  In a centralized, one-party presidential 
system like Burkina Faso’s, real policy making power resides with the president and 
his or her entourage (Jackson and Rosberg 1982).  Groups seeking change have few 
avenues beyond the highest levels of government to achieve policy change.  Yet 
access to these individuals is frequently tightly regulated, being limited to party 
activists, personal contacts, and politically important businessmen or political 
patrons.  
Burkina Faso’s political leadership today faces significant international and domestic 
pressure to open the political system and to create new avenues for public influence 
over policy, a process generally referred to as democratization.  In response to a 
perceived loss of domestic legitimacy and international requirements to democratize 
the political system, Burkina Faso’s ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) 
party has chosen to gradually open the political system to new participants (Santiso 
and Loada 2003).  Today, the government is run by a coalition of parties which 
nonetheless remain loyal to the president and CDP.  In the parliamentary elections of 
May 2002, the CDP altered electoral rules to increase the representation of opposition 
parties, both loyal and otherwise, and to decrease its own majority.  Furthermore, the 
government has undertaken a decentralization policy designed to give real policy 
making power to local elected governments.  All of these transformations bode well 
for the creation of alternate pressure points to influence policy. 
Before celebrating these advances, however, it is important to note their weaknesses.  
According to political scientists studying Burkina’s democratization process, the 
gradual opening of the political system has been highly calculated.  The CDP, sensing 
a threat to its own legitimacy and long-term control of the Burkinabè state, has 
altered electoral rules and named opposition ministers in order to gain domestic and 
international esteem.  By carefully orchestrating the limited incorporation of loyal 
opposition groups into government, the CDP has cultivated an illusion of 
democratization without actually threatening its own control over government.  As a 
result, many coalition parliament and cabinet members owe their position to the 
ruling party, but the CDP is not dependent on these coalition members or their 
parties, as it does not need their participation to achieve a majority.  These parties 
therefore cannot operate as real opposition parties.  True opposition parties 
meanwhile are marginalized in the current government and parliament.   
The decentralization program faces its own difficulties.  Decentralization is frequently 
perceived as an affront to the power of central government officials and politicians.  
This is particularly the case when decentralization involves transferring control over 
government funds from the central government and its agencies to local-level 
governments.  In resource-poor states, government agencies often guard their 
resources jealously.  Furthermore, in patronage based political systems, the loss of 
financial resources often translates into a loss of political power and significance.  It is 
not surprising therefore that Burkina Faso’s political decentralization has not resulted 
in the financial decentralization necessary to allow local governments to engage in 
true policy making.  Nor have national politicians or parties been willing to disengage 
from local politics.  And local politicians have employed decentralization as a means 
of accessing national politics without focusing on the needs and demands of local 
voters.  In the governments’ decentralized bodies, the key to local electoral success Pressure Points: Power in Burkinabè Politics 
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appears to depend more on one’s standing with the national party than on one’s 
platform for local change.  
Regardless of its flaws, Burkina’s progress toward democracy has had positive effects 
on citizens’ access to policy making.  Although largely dominated by party machines, 
the electoral process nonetheless requires that candidates be palatable to the 
electorate.  Candidates have an incentive to appeal to their constituents because the 
parties sponsoring these candidates are unlikely to stick by extremely unpopular 
candidates.  Furthermore, while limited, the decentralization process is opening new 
spaces for citizen input and participation in local decision making.   
What do these political changes mean for individuals and organizations interested in 
helping promote pro-poor livestock policies?  The first message to take away from this 
brief analysis is that the pressure politics of democratic political systems may not be 
the most efficient way to achieve policy change in Burkina Faso.  There simply are too 
few spaces beyond the highest levels of government where real policy change occurs; 
and at the highest levels of government, real debate and conflict is uncommon.   
However, to the extent that politicians must build favour among both party leaders 
and voters, they do have an incentive to advocate for voters’ interests.  In voting 
districts where livestock producers constitute a significant proportion of the voters, 
politicians may find it in their interest to advocate for their cause.  In fact, politicians 
from pastoral areas have been among the most active in pushing for long registration 
periods to ensure that all Burkinabè citizens, including transhumant pastoralists, are 
represented in the voting process.  The second, perhaps sinister, message to take 
from this discussion is that the true policy makers, the president and his entourage, 
may be receptive to livestock producers’ demands if they see in these demands a 
means of increasing their own legitimacy.  The state’s fiscal condition is fundamental 
to providing the public services and supporting the patronage system which helps to 
k e e p  t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  p o w e r .     I f  livestock producers and their supporters can 
increase leaders’ consciousness of the potential fiscal contributions of the sector, they 
might be able to increase political interest in promoting the sector.  Unfortunately, 
knowing that most livestock policy of relevance to them is generated within the 
Ministry of Livestock, livestock producers focus all organizational efforts on engaging 
the ministry rather than addressing the political leaders responsible for making 
funding decisions that largely determine the range of options available to the 
ministry. 
At present Burkina Faso’s political leaders have shown only limited interest in the 
livestock sector.  Beyond a few speeches and efforts in the sector, it has remained 
largely off the political radar screen.  This results in a lack of state funding or large-
scale development efforts.  Furthermore, the current minister, though well respected 
by ministry civil servants, is a minor player in the present government, making him a 
poor representative in the fight for funding.  Beyond questions of funding and general 
direction, the low profile of the ministry has had positive side effects.  It is left almost 
entirely to its own devices in creating specific policy for the livestock sector.  This 
means that civil servants trained in animal health, livestock management, and 
agronomy dominate decision making in the livestock sector.  In interviews, it became 
clear that these civil servants are committed to developing the sector.  Many are very 
concerned with assisting poor, small-holder livestock producers and understand the 
stakes involved in improving poor producers’ livelihoods.  These competent and 
committed individuals can have great latitude in creating and implementing livestock 
policy.  Certain have even used their administrative position to develop recommended 
legislation and get it passed through the government, as in the example of the recent 
Loi d’Orientation Relative au Pastoralisme au Burkina Faso
15 which civil servants in 
                                                 
15 The law was passed in November 2002 but has not yet been applied.  Negotiations are still in progress between local 
authorities and representatives of the Ministry of Livestock on how to implement the new regulations. Pressure Points: Power in Burkinabè Politics 
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the ministry saw as a key step to securing livestock producers’ access to land.  Others 
have actively pursued donor sponsors for the ministry projects they believed 
necessary.  Almost without exception, interviewees from donor agencies noted that all 
projects and programs began because of the initiative of the Ministry of Livestock. 
The dominance of ministry employees in livestock policy making has also had negative 
consequences for the sector.  Many argue the ministry is too dominant across the 
sector, leaving little room for private or producer-driven initiative.  While civil 
servants from the ministry argue that they always consult interested stakeholders 
before implementing policy, stakeholders express serious frustration with this process.  
They argue that they are presented with new policies as a fait accompli.  No room or 
time is given for fundamental changes to policy.  Feedback is accepted but not 
incorporated into policy decisions.  Producer associations and other stakeholders feel 
they merely rubber stamp a policy created by ministry civil servants.  At present the 
state’s action in the livestock sector is guided by a national planning document, the 
Plan d’Actions et Programme d’Investissement du Secteur de l’Élevage.  Although 
ministry officials prided themselves on the consultative process employed in 
developing the plan, stakeholders outside the ministry expressed frustration at having 
been consulted only at the approval state in the process and not in the earlier 
elaboration periods.  Because the document is intended as the reference point for 
sectoral policies, producers’ concerns not raised in the elaboration period are unlikely 
to be addressed after the development of the plan.  Ultimately this can undermine 
the effectiveness of policies because they do not reflect the real on-the-ground 
concerns of stakeholders.   
For all the downfalls of being neglected by politicians and receiving little funding, the 
current position of the Ministry of Livestock offers some advantages from the point of 
view of pro-poor interventions.  The Ministry of Livestock is starved of financial 
resources.  Livestock receives a mere 1.5 percent of the resources allocated to 
development in Burkina Faso (MRA 2000).  Without resources of its own, the ministry is 
willing to devote time and effort to implementing almost any project if it is 
sponsored, at least in part, by an outside donor.  Furthermore, interviewees from 
donor agencies have found the ministry receptive and responsible in implementing 
livestock programs.  Perhaps the political neglect of the sector has also allowed the 
ministry to operate independent of some of the nefarious political influences often 
denounced by frustrated donor agencies.   
•  Strategic Entry Point 11: The Ministry of Livestock offers a valuable partner in the 
implementation of pro-poor policies.  Not only are its civil servants generally 
receptive to pro-poor goals, the resource-poor ministry is willing to implement 
almost any pro-poor policy if it receives funding.  
The quest for funding is a common theme not only in the Ministry of Livestock but 
across Burkina’s government which relies on foreign assistance for 80 percent of its 
expenditures.  When asked where real decision-making power in the agricultural 
sector (livestock included) lies, almost all respondents replied, “the World Bank”.  At 
times all international financial institutions, including the International Monetary 
Fund, were being subsumed into the term “the World Bank”.  Still the common 
message is clear: stakeholders in Burkina Faso’s livestock sector are frustrated with 
the excessive power of international organizations in local policy making.   
Although respondents spoke of the negative effects of structural adjustment policies 
on animal health (see above), they focused particularly on the possible ramifications 
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the related policy guide, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which was completed for Burkina Faso in 
2000.  Both the HIPC program for Burkina and the PRSP were negotiated through 
Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Finance with, observers argue, no input from other relevant 
ministries.  Although a certain percentage of HIPC funds are intended for livestock 
programs, the Ministry of Finance is ultimately responsible for allocating these funds. Pressure Points: Power in Burkinabè Politics 
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Interviewees held that the PRSP elaboration process was essentially closed to much 
needed stakeholder input.  In part because the PRSP had to be elaborated in a very 
short period of time, no opportunities were offered to stakeholders either within or 
outside the government to offer true feedback on the document.  Due to the lack of 
reliable poverty statistics in the livestock sector, this meant that many of the 
concerns of stakeholders in the livestock sector were not raised during the elaboration 
process.  The lack of input is worrisome precisely because the PRSP provides the 
policy backbone for international assistance in the years to come.  To the extent that 
it does not addresses stakeholders concerns it risks directing all future international 
interventions away from these problem areas. 
Burkina Faso’s political system, like all political systems, has points at which pressure 
can be applied to achieve policy change.  However, unlike developed democratic 
systems where pressure can frequently be applied at multiple levels and through 
multiple channels, the political system in Burkina has relatively few pressure points.  
Real decision making is concentrated in the hands of the President and leaders of his 
party and neither face real competition from opposing parties.  The lack of true 
democratic competition makes it difficult to raise new issues in this political system.  
H o w e v e r ,  w e  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g s  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  g o v e r n a n c e  c r e a t e  t h e  
possibility for forming coalitions with elected officials from areas with a concentration 
of livestock producers and for increasing producer involvement in local decision-
making.  It is also clear that the political insignificance of the livestock ministry can at 
times give civil servants important discretion in making livestock policy.  Finally, it 
has been shown that for better or worse, one of the key means for creating policy 
change in Burkina Faso is through external funding mechanisms.  However, unless 
these policies have an important domestic constituency to support them and keep 
them going once funding has been withdrawn, they will not be sustainable.   
Therefore, it is important to consider these political recommendations in conjunction 
with the earlier discussion of organizational context. 
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CONCLUSION: NAVIGATING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY  
OF THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR 
It is worth returning at this point to the observation offered at the outset of this 
paper—if we consider the nature of politics and power relations, it is surprising that 
pro-poor policies ever get made.  But this is not sufficient reason for interested actors 
to abandon their attempts to forward pro-poor policies in Burkina Faso.  The stakes 
are too high.  With 45 percent of Burkina Faso’s population living below the poverty 
line according to World Bank statistics, it is imperative that interested actors learn to 
negotiate the politics and power relations that often work to inhibit pro-poor policies 
from getting made. 
In the livestock sector, opportunities do exist to generate pro-poor policies.  Although 
not all poor producers are organized to defend their interests, well-defined groups of 
livestock producers have been able to organize successfully.  These groups can be 
allies in the push to create pro-poor policies.  While poor producers remain somewhat 
vulnerable in existing commercial systems, these commercial systems are 
exceptionally well-adapted to the Burkinabè economy.  These systems for the 
marketing of village poultry, small ruminants, and cattle provide strong starting points 
for promoting the livestock sector.  And though Burkina Faso’s political system is not 
nearly as democratic or decentralized as its leaders argue it to be, increasing political 
competition and decentralization is opening up new spaces for citizen participation 
and influence in the making of government policy.  Those seeking to take advantage 
of these opportunities must realize, however, that political realities in Burkina Faso 
will dictate how they should go about exploiting existing opportunities.  
This paper has highlighted three particularly serious political constraints, but has 
sought to turn these constraints into opportunities.  First, the political marginalization 
of the Ministry of Livestock and the apathy of most elected leaders toward the 
problems of the livestock sector risk perpetuating the state’s neglect of the sector.  
However, it has also been argued that the political marginality of the ministry may 
actually allow more room for pro-poor policy makers to influence the actions of the 
ministry.  And it may be possible to take advantage of a second constraint to actually 
raise the political salience of livestock issues.  While the Burkinabè political system 
remains a de facto single-party system without real democratic competition, the 
system is under stress.  For political leaders trying to keep their position secure, it has 
been shown that export earnings are a key political tool.  To the extent that 
politicians become convinced of the significance of livestock export earnings to 
maintaining the state’s fiscal balance, it may be possible to turn Burkina’s democratic 
deficit into an advantage for livestock producers.  Finally, this paper has 
demonstrated that in resource-poor Burkina Faso, those external organizations that 
finance the government have an exceptional influence on government policy.  Actors 
seeking to change policy cannot get around the influence of these organizations, but 
by carefully considering how to generate pro-poor policies that also respect the 
priorities of these organizations, they can perhaps motivate these funding 
organizations to adopt pro-poor policies.  In Burkina Faso today, this means adapting 
pro-poor policies to the priorities of the World Bank, including efforts to promote the 
private sector and the application of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  However, 
as the strategic entry points suggested above demonstrate, in the realm of animal 
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